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ABSTRACT

Using four case studies, the paper explores whether the philosophical reflections on the meaning of life by older adults constitute a developmental stage as defined by Piaget. Prefacing his analysis with discussions of the Erikson model of ego stages and the Fowler "Faith Interview" methods, Kohlberg hypothesizes hierarchical levels that occur in adulthood. Next, the author draws upon 1979 case studies of faith systems in 40 older adults which determined their feelings about the future; meaning of life; ethical standards; communal identification; intimacy and sexuality; transcendental beauty, evil, and suffering; and death and dying. In his analysis of four of the case studies, Kohlberg theorizes that after attainment of Stage 5 post-conventional morality, two paths of further development are possible. One leads to Stage 6 morality of rational justice; the other to an exemplary ethic of agape (putting the other before the self). This stage, however, cannot be defined by the hypothetical moral dilemmas used to measure preceding stages. The author concludes that the stages do not illustrate strict Piagetian stage-sequential development and that development of advanced stages of faith may depend more upon life crises than on experiences of social and moral conflict. (KC)

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The Aging Person as Philosopher: Moral Development in the Adult Years

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by

Lawrence Kohlberg and Richard Shulik

February, 1981

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The Aging Person as Philosopher: Moral Development in the Adult Years[1]

Lawrence Kohlberg and Richard Shulik

February 1981

Shades of the prison house begin to
Close upon the growing boy,
But he beholds the light and whence it flows
He sees it in his joy:
The Youth, who daily farther
from the east
Must tread, still is Nature's Priest,
And by the vision splendid
Is on his way attended;
At length the man perceives it die away,
And fade into the light of commonday.

The thought of our past years in me doth breed
Perpetual benediction for those shadowing recollections
Which, be they what they may,
Are yet the fountain light of all our day,
Are yet a master light of all our seeing;
Uphold us, cherish, and have power to make
Our noisy years seem moments in the being
Of the eternal silence; truths that wake,
To perish never:
Which neither listlessness, nor mad endeavor,
Nor man nor boy,
Nor all that is enmity with joy,
Can utterly abolish or destroy:

What though the radiance which was once so bright
Be now forever taken from my sight,
Though nothing can bring back the hour
Of splendor in the grass, of glory in the flowers;
We will grieve not, rather find
Strength in what remains behind;
In the soothing thoughts that spring
Out of human suffering;
In the faith that looks through death,
In years that bring the philosophic mind.

The clouds that gather round the setting sun
Do take a sober coloring from an eye
That hath kept watch o'er man's mortality;
Another race has been, and other races are won.
Thanks to the human heart by which we live,
Thanks to its tenderness, its joys and fears,
To me the nearest flower that blooms can give
Thought that do often lie too deep for tears.

--Wordsworth,

We have prefaced each of our essays on the human being as a philosopher with portions of Wordsworth's poem on the life-cycle. The section on later adulthood tells us that there is a "master light of all our seeing" which has "power to make our noisy years seem moments in the being of the eternal silence." Though this master light is no longer the adolescent "hour of splendor in the grass, or glory in the flower," it does bring "strength in the soothing thoughts that spring out of human suffering; in the faith that looks through death, in years that bring the philosophic mind."

Is There Positive Development in the Adult and Aging?

Was Wordsworth right about "the years that bring the philosophic mind"? First we wish to raise the issue as to whether aging persons are philosophers, engaging in personal reflection upon the basic meaning of their lives and the lives of others. Second, we raise the issue of whether there is positive development occurring through such philosophic reflection. Wordsworth expresses this positive development as an awareness of "truths that wake to perish never" which bring "soothing thoughts that spring out of human suffering," and as "faith that looks through death," with a sense that "the meanest flower that blooms can give thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears." In this essay, we report interviews indicating that at least some aging persons have the outlook expressed by Wordsworth. We assume that if we wish to address the first two questions, we may best start by asking aging persons to answer these questions themselves, directly. This at least is the approach used by Shulik (1979) in an interview study of 40 persons between the ages of 60 and 86 in the Boston area.

The answer of many of them to these two questions was "yes." In the words of one of these subjects,

> "By the time you've grown older, you've generated a rather lengthy history of personal experiences, wisdom, and what you could call a fund of personal experimentation in life. You can use that history. Very simply, when you were younger, you may have been logical and idealistic but you hadn't the history to use. It simply wasn't there; it wasn't available to you."

Hence, when they are questioned directly about growth in wisdom, sensitivity, and philosophical insight, many older subjects give positive answers. But there is relatively little documentation of such trends in the literature of gerontological research. No doubt, students of adulthood and aging have usually relied upon psychological tests of personality and cognition, tests hardly likely to reveal personal self-reflection or growth in wisdom, as distinct from personality traits or psychiatric status. Hence the trends in question have been, perhaps, invisible to the researcher's analytical eye.

Moreover, it seems that only some aging persons engage in the kind of personal reflection which leads to a growth in wisdom; many others do not have such an experience. As we shall elaborate, Shulik (1979) found only some aging persons high in "age-sense" (perceived developmental change concomitant with personal reflection). This is yet another reason why the growth of wisdom may seem invisible to many gerontologists.

A third question we ask is, given positive change in adulthood, is such change structural stage change? In the present essay, the authors will attempt to consider whether the postulated growth in wisdom, or inphilosophical sensitivity, constitutes a form of general, structural change in the philosophical reasoning of their older subjects. However, to establish a background of understanding, in the issue of structural versus non-structural changes, the authors wish to review the unfolding of that issue, as it

occurred in the context of the moral development research. Initially, in the moral realm, Kohlberg was skeptical about the possibility of structural stage change occurring in the adult years. In Chapter 5 of this book, written in 1969, Kramer and Kohlberg concluded that there was no structural stage change, at least in moral judgment, in adulthood. Rather there seemed to be developmental changes in subjects' ego-functional uses of moral thinking, changes which could be identified with Erikson's discussions of identity and commitment. College students were seen as retrogressing in moral stage while progressing in the Eriksonian development of an identity. But in Chapter 6, written in 1973, Kohlberg concluded that Kramer and he were wrong in doubting the existence of adulthood structural changes, and concluded that retrogression was really a transition from an adolescent stage 4 (conventional social perspective) to an adult stage 5 (a prior to society perspective). Stage 5 appeared to be an adulthood stage first attained by some subjects in their early twenties and by others in the later twenties or early thirties. Stage 6 seemed to occur even later than Stage 5. Accordingly, Kohlberg's Piaget model of structural moral development was extended through the entirety of the lifespan. Part of his confidence in making this extension was based on postulation of a sixth stage. He has, however, been unable to identify firmly a sixth stage, in longitudinal studies conducted in America and in other cultures, such as Turkey and Israel.

In moral development, is there a sixth stage, and is it better than stage 5? This remains a controversial and uncertain issue, which is discussed at lenth in the first volume of the present work. There, the formal notion of stage-six principles is clarified. The question of whether "Stage 6" principles of egalitarian justice and respect for human personality are distinct from, and in some sense better than, "Stage 5" principles of utility or maximum

public welfare, is also explored. Here, the philosophic discussion of Volume I will be very briefly summarized. Drawing upon the moral theory of Immanuel Kant and its recent monumental elaboration in Rawls' (1971) Theory of Justice, Volume I argues that Stage 6 principles and reasoning provide better resolutions of moral dilemmas than Stage 5 (Vol. I, Chapters 4 and 5).

While Stage 5 defines universal human rights, it cannot clearly define personal duties corresponding to these rights in the absence of legal agreement and the social contract. Here is an example from a Stage 5 moral philosopher responding to the Heinz dilemma.

> "What Heinz did was not wrong. The distribution of scarce drugs should be regulated by principles of fairness. In the absence of such regulations, the druggist was within his legal rights, but in the circumstances he has no moral complaint. While what Heinz did was not wrong, it was not his duty to do it. In this case it was not wrong for Heinz to steal the drug, but it goes beyond the call of duty; it is a deed of supererogation."

The reasoning of this philosopher, which we call Stage 5, relies on conceptions of moral rights and principles of fairness which are prior to society's laws and which should regulate the law and the druggist's behavior. His use of principles, however, fails to manifest two characteristics shown by Stage 6 reasoning. His Stage 5 notion of principles guiding the formation of laws and a social contract guarantees certain rights and elements of fairness. His principles, however, do not define clear duties when society does not protect these rights. For the husband to steal the drug is legitimate, given the wife's right to life, but "it goes beyond the call of duty, it is a deed of supererogation." Moreover, his Stage 5 notion of principle is not a clearly formulated basis for decision upon which all people can and should ideally agree. The "principles of fairness" regulating drugs may vary from system to system and "in the absence of legal regulation the druggist was within his legal rights."

In contrast, Stage 6 principles attempt, first, to define duties prior to society as well as rights. An example is the response of another moral philosopher, classified as Stage 6. He is asked, "If the husband does not feel very close or affectionate to his wife, should he steal the drug?" He answers, "Yes. The value of her life is independent of any personal ties. The value of human life is a source of a categorical moral 'ought' to any rational being acting in the role of a moral agent. He is further asked, "Suppose it were a friend or acquaintance?" He answers, "Yes, the value of human life remains the same.

In addition, Stage 6 reasoning attempt to define universal principles of decision on which all moral persons should agree, prior to a concrete social contract, rather than simply recognizing certain rights and values which a social contract may consider.

The Stage 6 response to the dilemma indicates this awareness as follows:

> It is my belief that systems of law are valid, only insofar as they reflect the sort of moral law which most rational persons recognize and all rational people can accept. Not only can laws conflict but also laws can in some situations tend to contradict the ultimate ground of the law, individual justice, the right of every person to an equal consideration of his claims in every situation--not just those which happen to be codified in law. This law of justice is perhaps best formulated in Kant's "formula": "treat each person as an end, not a means."

Clearly, this moral philosopher, classified as Stage 6, adheres to a tradition of moral philosophy running from Kant to Rawls. That is the tradition of formalistic and "deontological" moral principles, or principles of justice (as opposed to principles of utility or perfection). Thus, to claim that Stage 6 is better than Stage 5 is to make a very controversial philosophic claim. The most forceful recent statement of this claim has been made by Rawls (1971). He claims (1) that there are universal principles

of justice on which rational persons establishing a society can and should agree, (2) that these principles of justice are (a) the maximum liberty compatible with the like liberty of others and (b) no inequalities which are not to the benefit of the least advantaged, and (3) that these principles would be chosen by rational persons if they adopted an "original position" of impartiality defined by a "veil of ignorance" as to the position they themselves would have in the society they are establishing.

Our empirical work supports Rawls' claim in two senses. First, the persons whose responses we call Stage 6 do agree on principles of justice, such as the two principles of Rawls. They agree in their resolutions of moral dilemmas more than do Stage 5 persons. Second, Stage 6 persons spontaneously resolve moral dilemmas by entering something like Rawls' "original position" of impartiality. They engage in role-taking with every person involved in the dilemma. They imagine themselves as the wife and the druggist as well as the husband, and they ask themselves whether they could live with the alternative choices. In a sense, they "play moral musical chairs" to decide what's fairest.

Using the Golden Rule, they imagine themselves in the druggist's place as well as the wife's. But then they imagine the druggist's claim if the druggist put himself in the wife's place. The druggist might put property before life, but not if he were to step into the wife's shoes. The wife places life before property; she could still hold that position standing in the druggist's shoes. In the original position, imagining they didn't know who they were morally, rational persons would agree. Thus, Stage 6 thinkers come to agreement on the principles of justice which should guide moral choice.

Why is justice the central principle at Stage 6? Our conception of Stage 6 justice does not, itself, adequately define the moral value of love or agape. We return to this issue in a later section of this essay. We

point out that love involves us in the realm of supererogation, not duties on which all could agree. Of our various values, some define merely desirable actions, but others define obligations or duties. Choices which are moral obligations are choices not just for ourselves but for all people. Kant said that the idea of an obligation implied a categorical imperative: So act as you would want all humankind to act in your place.

Moral values are distinct from other values, then, in defining duties as universalizeable. In addition, duties imply rights. If moral duties rest on rights, moral values rest on justice.

Having stated the philosophic claims of Stage 6, we must add that Stage 6 is poorly defined, empirically. All of our own Stage 6 data come from interviews with moral philosophers over 25. The men whose written words we cite as Stage 6 are men with serious moral philosophic training, men like Martin Luther King who studied Tillich's moral theology of justice or respect for personality.

None of our longitudinal subjects, now in their thirties, has reached Stage 6. Because of its rarity and its contamination with philosophic training and doctrine, then, our research has not yet let us fully define it as a useful stage in the study of adult development. Its use is primarily speculative to clarify the philosophic meaning of moral stages and their claim to adequacy.

From the point of view of psychological assessment, the sixth stage is not found at all in youthful populations. Given the absence of confirming longitudinal data from adulthood, what was once termed Stage 6 is now tentatively identified as an advanced sub-stage of stage 5. This means that the 1973 assumption of the existence of adulthood structural stages is attenuated, resting solely on the existence of a Stage 5, usually attained between the years 20 to 25--a time that can still be considered a period of late adolescent

or youthful growth in biological and cognitive capacity.

Are There Structural Stages in Adulthood? The Status of Stage 5

Critics like John Gibbs (1979) question the existence of adult structural stages on the grounds that our Stage 5 is not a Piagetian structure of new operations of moral judgment. Gibbs claims that Stage 5 is merely a philosophic theory. He states:

> Kohlberg's level-of-discourse revisions in "Continuities and Discontinuities Revisited' were, in fact, a mixed blessing. Although lending new insight into the form of stage 3 and stage 4 thinking, the discourse analysis also in effect divorced the nature of 'principled' thinking from the usual sort of data of interest to a Piagetian psychologist. The meta-ethically reflective discourse identified by Kohlberg as critical to distinguishing the principled stages squares poorly with the Piagetian conception of ontogenetic stages as deep structures discovered through inferences as to organizations in subjects' problem-solving behavior
>
> Whereas a subject's direct justification of a choice in a transitivity or conservation problem is one thing, a subject's definition of a theory does in fact seem to be of a qualitatively distinct nature. To postulate that the articulation of a theory of natural rights and social contract (stage 5) signifies a higher natural stage in moral judgment would seem tantamount to postulating in cognitive development, that subjects who articulate a theory of the scientific method (and not subjects who merely evidence such strategies in their problem-solving reasoning) are to be accorded the status of a higher natural stage. Although Piaget has been willing to speculate that reflective philosphies may signify 'realizations' (p. 28) extending from natural stage origins, he does not consider those philosophies themselves to be natural stages.

First, we do not agree with Gibbs' conception. We think that Stage 5 is a universal "natural" stage of moral development rather than a mere philosophic theory justifying a more sophisticated type of Stage 4 judgment. To make this point we present in Table 1 (Form A #35, 1978) a Stage 5 criterion judgment about the Heinz dilemma from our manual (1979) with a match example from a

longitudinal subject reasoning at Stage 5. The subject makes his decision

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

based on a universal hierarchy of rights. It is this which leads his reasoning to be scored Stage 5, and not his use of a philosophic, social contract theory to justify his judgments. In the second place in Chapter 4, we reported research on judgment and action suggesting that Stage 5 (or Stage 6) thinker act differently than Stage 4 reasoners. At the extremes this is manifested by figures like Socrates or Martin Luther King and in a less extreme way by a Stage 5 Michael Bernhardt who refused to shoot civilians at My Lai. In the third place Stage 5 is more than a different way of resolving justice problems than Stage 4. It is a stage found in all complex societies studied, including non-Western countries like India, Turkey, Israel and Zambia. (Blasi and Broughton, 1980, Chapter 8 of this volume.)

Structural Moral Stages Probably Chart Development Only Through Youth

While we do not agree with Gibbs about Stage 5, we are forced to agree with him that Stage 6 is a rare metaethical or philosophic construction involving operative moral judgments which are fairly close to those of Stage 5. Furthermore, even if more extensive longitudinal study indicates the existence of a sixth moral stage, it is likely to be found developing in youth rather than later in adulthood, as is the case with Stage 5. It is very likely that processes of personal and self-reflective development in adulthood and aging would not be reflected directly in changes in our moral stages.

The success of our scheme and method in tapping moral development in childhood and youth comes from its focus on assuming general moral judgment competence. This assessment has been based on the premise that the child or adolescent is a philosopher engaged with the problems discussed by moral philosophers, and that the direction of development is in the direction of constructing rational principles of justice discussed from Plato's Republic to Rawls' Theory of Justice. The growth of the sense of justice and of human rights, then, is what is traced in our moral stage scheme.

The principles of justice arrived at by youths at our fifth stage are hardly unique personal discoveries and revelations; they are exemplified in the Declaration of Independence as well as Rawls' Theory of Justice.

The reasons for the success of the scheme and method for charting adolescent moral development may be exactly the reasons that it will not be successful in charting development after 30. The "wisdom" of our fifth (or sixth) stage subjects of 30 is embodied in a formal logic of definition and axiomatic proof by John Rawls, who derives Kant's principle of the categorical imperative from the modern economic theory of games. Just because philosophers define the "higher" and say why it is "better" in the realm of justice by formal or logical reasoning, the "higher" should be an accessible stage of development for youth whose logical reasoning capacities are presumably completely developed. For these reasons we are forced to agree at least partly with Gibbs about adult development despite our disagreement with his interpretation of Stage 5.

Gibbs' argument for the lack of structural development in adulthood is represented by the following statement:

> My own approach follows the road not taken by Kohlberg in 1973. Reversing the Kohlberg declaration cited earlier, I would say that 'there are two kinds of development, not one'. In the following argument, I will propose a two-phase view of human development, such that a cross-culturally uniform or standard phase of growth eventually enables members of the human species to become existentially self-aware in such a profound sense that a uniquely human phase of consciousness and development comes to be initiated. Piaget's work has addressed standard development, up to and including achievement of the foundation for existential development in adulthood and I see Kohlberg's work as quite parallel to Piaget's in this sense. My proposed revision of Kohlberg's theory is 'Piagetian' in that it gives to Piaget, so to speak, that which is Piaget's--or that which, among Kohlberg's stages, a Piagetian would want to claim. The term 'phase' seems most appropriate to refer to the two senses of development, since a temporal overlap between them is posited: in adolescence, not only does standard development come to fruition, but as well, the basis for existential development is established. Also, it should be noted that the sophistication, scope, and consistency of the standard developmental stages continue to develop over the course of the adult years.
>
> A fairly cogent argument for positing a fundamental qualitative distinction between child and adult development has been put forth by Flavell (1970). Flavell's argument for a two-phase model can be represented as follows. First, whereas basic cognitive change in childhood seems to be irreversible or virtually inevitable as well as uniform in direction and sequence, there is no evidence that such features characterize adult cognitive change Second, the biological growth factors associated with maturation of the nervous system are evident primarily during childhood, consummating in late adolescence. Third (relating the first two points), the restriction of maturation to childhood, where it could contribute as an 'underlying presence' to cognitive change, may account for why general uniformity and inevitability in direction are found in child but not adult cognitive change. Fourth, although adult cognitive change does not seem to partake of the 'morphogenetic' features of child cognitive development (especially uniformity), it does have some interesting features in its own right. Adult thinking is notable, for example, for its 'theories regarding the self, others, and the human condition generally'.

In our sixth chapter, on "Continuities and Discontinuities Revisited," we distinguished between structural and functional stages, saying that the latter were more descriptive of development in youth and adulthood and were more determined by personal experience and reflection. In this sense we partially agreed with Gibbs' and Flavell's notion of the unique characteristics of adulthood development with its "existential" reflective theories of the human condition. We do not want however to distinguish as sharply between structural stages and functional phases or eras as do Gibbs and Flavell. To clarify why we do not want to abandon the stage idea for adulthood (even if we give up a strict Piagetian construction of it), we shall take a look at the interesting work of Levinson et al. (1978) on adulthood which does abandon the sequential stage idea and replaces it with the idea of life "phases" or "eras."

Adulthood Periods or Phases

It may be, as Gibbs suggests, that the personal reflection or personal history and experience in adulthood contributes to something which could be called eras or periods of adulthood but which would not be structural levels or stages. This is the claim articulately put forward on the basis of case-studies by Levinson et al.(1978). A detailed discussion of the Levinson conceptions of periods, eras, or "seasons" in a man's life is beyond the scope of this chapter. In our earlier chapter on "Discontinuities Revisited" we made the distinction between "structural" stages and the "functional" stages of Erikson. Levinson explicitly states that his periods are functional and should not even be called stages, although he believes they are sequential. He says (1978, p. 319):

> Some theories describe developmental stages that follow an ascending or hierarchical order. A person advances from one level to the next, each stage representing a higher capability. The stage theories of Lawrence Kohlberg, Jean Piaget and Jane Loevinger are of this kind and they have contributed to our understanding of human development.

> Other theories, such as Erikson's and ours posit a sequence that is not hierarchical. One period is not higher or better than another. Again the imagery of the seasons is useful. Spring is not intrinsically a better season than winter, nor is summer better than spring. Each season plays its essential part in the unfolding of the life cycle, and the sequence has a prescribed course. The tasks of one period are not better or more advanced than those of another except in the general sense that each period builds upon the work of earlier and represents a later phase in the cycle. There are losses as well as gains in the shift from every period or era to the next."

Unlike ourselves, but like Erikson, Levinson ties his eras to age in a very maturational or Gesellian sense. He says (p. 318):

> "One of our greatest surprises was the relatively low variability in the age at which every period begins and ends. It was not a prediction we made in advance nor a predisposition in our thinking. This finding violates the long-held and cherished idea that individual adults develop at very different paces. Only when we look at development in terms of the evolution of life structure do the periods follow an age-linked sequence."

The Adult and Aging Person as a Religious Philosopher

We wish to claim, then, that there are "hierarchical levels" or positive development in adulthood and aging, something more than periods, though perhaps less than strict structural stages.

To look for such positive development in adulthood and aging we are better off focusing on a less "formal" and more personal domain than justice, the domain assigned by Erikson as well as by folk wisdom to the aging, that of ethical and religious philosophies. To do so we shall draw upon two theories of ego stages, that of Erikson's functional theory and more intensively that of James Fowler's (1976, 1978) more structural theory of stages of faith.

In our essay on "Continuities and Discontinuities Revisited" we discussed the Erikson functional model of ego stages at length and compared and contrasted it with the Piagetian structural model, particularly with regard to adolescence and youth. We now need to note that in Erikson's model, the older adult passes through a seventh stage centering on generativity vs. stagnation,

a stage whose central concern is given by the roles of parent and mentor. The virtue of this stage related to the sense of generativity is that of ethicality. In terms of our moral stages, such ethicality would reflect a living out of principled (Stage 5 or 6) morality.

There remains for Erikson's aging adult a task which is partly ethical, but more basically religious (in the broadest sense of the term "religious") a task defining an eighth stage whose outcomes are a sense of integrity versus a sense of despair. The problem of integrity is not the problem of moral integrity but the problem of the integration and integrity of meaning of the individual's life and its negative side, despair, hovers around the awareness of death.

The concept of the self's integrity is psychological, but the concept of the integrity of the meaning of the self's life is philosophical or religious. As Santayana says (p. 181):

> "This struggling and changing force of religion seems to make for an ultimate harmony within the soul and for an ultimate harmony between the soul and all that the soul depends upon. So that Religion, in its intent, is a more conscious and direct pursuit of the Life of Reason than is society, science or art. For these approach the ideal life tentatively and piecemeal, hardly regarding the goal or caring for the ultimate justification of their instinctive aims. Religion also has an instinctive and blind side, but it soon feels its way toward the heart of things and veers in the direction of the ultimate."

Erikson's stages are stages of new ego functional content, not sheer content. Obviously it would be incorrect to call a concern for religion a characterization of a stage of adulthood and aging, since a religious concern may be manifest at any and every period of the life cycle. It may, however, be correct to claim that only the adult and aging persons are distinctively religious philosophers.

In our chapter on the child as a philosopher, we focused upon the child as a natural or physical philosopher and as a moral philosopher. Speculation about God's power and his nature as the cause of things arise, but these speculations are used to answer physical causation questions and concerns: Who and what makes the mountains, makes the clouds move? Where do you go when you're dead? In addition speculations about God, the devil, heaven and hell may be used to answer the following moral questions: Where do rules come from? How does Daddy know what's right? Why not break the law and sin?

In a sense, then, the concerns of the child as a philosopher are not distinctively religious concerns, they are "scientific" and moral concerns falling back on some ultimate power for their answer.

In our chapter on the adolescent (and youth) as a philosopher, we found a new focus of philosophizing, a focus upon the epistemology of knowledge and of morality. Subjectivism, idealism, solipsism and skepticism were the central characteristics of the adolescent as philosopher, and his progress was toward awareness of scientific methods and theorizings which gave some ground of objectivity to thought and toward awareness of moral methods and principles which gave some objectivity or universality to moral judgment.

In our view of the aging person as philosopher, however, we do see a distinctive focus on religious philosophy rather than a focus upon physical, epistemological and moral philosophy. In Chapter 9 of Volume I, we tried to clarify what we meant by religous concerns. These were narrower than the idea of "faith" which Fowler (1976, 1978) has used to discuss stage development. Fowler identifies faith with an orientation to an ultimate environment and defines it as present as much in the materialistic atheist as in the religious believer. Fowler's conception and assessment of faith stages is very inclusive

and holistic, including cognitive and moral stages as parts of his dimension. His labelling his stages as "faith stages" comes from his background and concerns as a Christian theologian in addition to his concerns as a developmental psychologist. From the point of view of a psychologist, Fowler's holistic stages represent a version of what Loevinger (1976) as well as Erikson terms "ego development."

In Chapter 3 of this volume, we clarified the sense in which cognitive stages, stages of social perspective-taking and moral stages could be distinguished within ego development, and parallel stages in each domain identified.

In Chapter 9 of Volume I, we suggested that Fowler's holistic stages could be considered to represent a dimension of ego development termed "ethical development" broader than our conception of moral stages. Ethical thinking, as in classics like Aristotle or Spinoza's Ethics represents not only 1) statements of moral principles, but also 2) conceptions of the good man and the good life resting 3) on a psychology of human nature and 4) on a religious or metaphysical perspective on the human condition. From our philosophic point of view, Fowler's faith stages represent stages of ethical and religious philosophies. From our pyschological point of view, they represent stages of ego development, as do Loevinger's (1976) or Erikson's (1963).

In Chapter 9 of Volume I we define religious concerns more narrowly as concerns about the ultimately limiting or uncertain elements in life, especially the limits of justice or morality. In this sense religion, in either its theistic or its pantheistic manifestations is a response to our uncertainty and pain when faced with moral injustice, with human suffering and with disease and death.

These metaphysical and religious problems are the challenge of integrating the ideal with the ultimately real. The task of metaphysics and religion is essentially the task of integrating the ideals of justice, love and truth with the ultimate nature and limits of reality. The reflections of children and youth on religious themes may be intense but are primarily appropriations from the child's religious community. It is primarily in adulthood and aging that we see the person as a constructor of his own religion and of religious meaning. The absence of such a self-constructed or post-conventional religious orientation in adolescence and youth is indicated by our longitudinal subjects, even those who had attained a post-conventional Stage 5 morality.

Some, like Case #2, a Stage 5 subject, say they put aside religious questions. Case 2 says:

> (WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE RELATION BETWEEN MORALITY AND RELIGION? WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS ABOUT LIFE'S MEANING AS THEY RELATE TO MORALITY?)
>
> "Now that's a good question. I don't think too much of religion, I'm afraid. I believe in the right to life and the right to enjoy life, but as far as organized religion goes — ."
>
> (HOW ABOUT THE MEANING OF LIFE AS YOU SEE IT?)
>
> "I take a rather hedonistic view, I guess, I think life is to be enjoyed and as far as anything before or after goes, I guess I could say I don't believe in it. I also don't think about it. I am here now, and I don't think I will be here afterwards, if there is anything to be here for."

Others relate their morality to religion, but view religion as an institution. Case #67 held this view as a Stage 4 graduate student. After Vietnam and movement to Stage 5, his view of religion became less institutional. Instead, it became a vague Kingdom of Heaven consistent with a sense of social purpose here below. He says:

> (WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE RELATION BETWEEN MORALITY AND RELIGION? WHAT DO YOU SEE AS LIFE'S MEANING AS IT RELATES TO MORALITY?)
>
> "Now I think that we were put on earth for some purpose and I think we are always trying to look for that purpose. I think it is absurd, as some of the strict Catholic teachings would say, that your purpose on earth is to continually praise and worship "God" -- He would have had to be a pretty egomaniac Creator to have made that the sole purpose of the world. The purpose of life on earth, perhaps, is to prepare us for some kind of higher existence, an existence which we cannot perceive at this point in time and to do it, perhaps, to be able to live among other created beings and to live in a certain atmosphere of peace, of love, living within and trying to create a harmonious life here so that the things that we learn here will help us in a higher existence or a different dimension of life. I think that living in harmony here is best for individuals and I think it is best for all society."

We report this data mainly to indicate that our longitudinal subjects, even those who have reached post-conventional Stage 5 morality, have not gone far toward development of a post-conventional religious orientation.

Fowler's Faith Stages and the Moral Stages

If the aging person may be conceived as a religious philosopher, Fowler's faith interview and his method of stage scoring was a natural way to explore development in this period. A tabular summary of Fowler's faith stages is presented in Table 2.

INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

Fowler has drawn upon both our moral structural stages and Erikson's ego functional stages in his description as is indicated by Table 3.

INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

We hope the stages will come to life for the reader through a set of case studies we shall report, taken largely from the Shulik (1979) study of an aging sample. The major theme of our Volume I chapter on religious or faith development is its argument, both logical and empirical, that 1) the moral and religious stages are parallel and 2) attainment of a given moral stage is necessary but not sufficient for attainment of the parallel faith or religious stage. In that chapter we relied upon data (a) which defined the faith stages explicitly in terms of religious concerns rather than more broadly as Fowler has done and (b) which used a rating scheme of faith-stage descriptions bringing out logically their morally related features.

In the Shulik study, neither of these steps, enhancing faith-moral parallelism, was taken. Nevertheless a high empirical correlation (Spearman rho 75, N=25, p .001) was found between moral stages on hypothetical dilemmas and independent ratings of stage on the faith interview. Discrepancies between faith and moral stage scores were usually, but not always, in the same direction, the moral stage score being higher than the faith stage score.

The Hypothesis of Stage 7

Kohlberg's notion that a given moral stage was necessary but not sufficient for a level of religious orientation led him to postulate a hypothetical Stage 7 (in the original unedited version of Chapter 6, published in 1973). His thinking was that the attainment of moral Stage 6 raised and left unanswered religious and metaphysical questions calling for a faith attitude (labelled Stage 7) as a resolution to these questions. This thinking about "Stage 7" occurred before

Fowler began his systematic empirical investigations of faith stages. In the present essay what we once termed "Stage 7" we shall term a still hypothetical Stage 6 of ethical and religious philosophy or of faith. Our thinking about a sixth stage of faith differs from Fowler's in a number of ways. Like moral Stage 6, a sixth stage of religious orientation is more a philosophic construction than a clear psychological structure found in longitudinal study. In spite of its uncertain empirical status, it is of particular interest in considering development in the aging.

The Method of the Shulik Study

Shulik employed Fowler's empirical methodology in a study of the faith systems of forty older subjects, ranging in age from sixty to eighty-six years. The early research experiences of Fowler and his associates suggest that a loosely structured interview format is most effective in eliciting the specific faith structures of the subjects. This interview format is roughly as follows:

In the first phase of the interview, the interviewer explains to the subject the general nature of the faith development research. This facet of the interview requires its own special form of clinical sensitivity. The materials elicited in the interview are highly personal; the interviewer must exercise care in establishing a good foundation of rapport. It is often convenient to gather factual and demographic data during this phase of the interview (e.g., family constellation, residential history, educational/career history, and the like), and to permit the subject to ask questions of the interviewer until he is comfortable.

The second phase of the interview is modelled upon Butler's notion of the life-review process, to a certain extent. The subject is asked to describe those five or six events, influences, or relationships in his life which he deems most important or most interesting. These are the "major life landmarks," and they might be described as those events which have made the subject into the kind of person that he is at this time. In revealing these "landmark events" in their life histories, many subjects begin a gradual and imperceptible transition into a discussion of values, beliefs, and philosophical ideals. This is essentially a transition into the third phase of the interview.

In the third phase the interviewer specifically probes into the philosophical system presented by the subject. Often this phase of the interview emerges directly from the preceeding phase. Commonly the interviewer may ask, "Why did you choose those specific landmark events (in your life-history review) as opposed to other events which you might have chosen? What makes those events so much more important? Are these kinds of events generally important for others, as well as for you?" The discussion at this point often generalizes into a treatment of life histories in general - and a treatment of value-systems maintained by others, some of whom may differ from the subject himself.

On the basis of his extensive experience in conducting faith development interviews, Fowler has compiled a list of commonly-addressed issues.

Thus the method combines a life history review of the sort which one might use for an Eriksonian analysis of life-eras with a set of questions about personal philosophy or areas of life-meaning.

The interview is as follows:

> Could you please tell me about the five or six events in your life which you may consider to be "landmark events" or events which were important in the shaping of your destiny?

A natural follow-up question is then as follows:

> Why do you think that these events were important? For example, why did you chooose them as opposed to other events which you could have described to me?

A set of issues are then covered, either as they unfold spontaneously in the interview or through explicit questions. The issues are as follows:

1. The future. What are your feelings about your personal future? What do you look forward to? What do you feel about the future of your community? Or of mankind in general? What do you anticipate, and for what are you preparing?

2. Meaning. What are your personal goals? What are the pursuits in your life which give you the greatest sense of meaning? What is the meaning of human community to you? What is the meaning of human achievement to you, in general?

3. Ethical standards and their bases. What are the bases of right, wrong, and responsibility that you use in your life? What is your understanding of morality? Why do you feel that you, or others, ought to be moral? How can we know what "morality" is, in situations which are difficult to judge?

4. Communal identification and belonging. What is the group of people with whom you identify? How might you relate to those who stand outside of this sphere? What meaning would your life have, outside of this sphere?

5. Intimacy and sexuality. What are your feelings about your own sexuality? What do you think is the proper place of sexuality in your life? What do you think should be the proper place of sexuality in a person's life, in general? What has been your experiences of intimacy? What are your feelings about the meaning of closeness in human life? What to you is the relationship betwen intimacy and sexuality?

6. Transcendent beauty or peak experiences. What have been the best experiences in your life? Have there been any moments when you felt more at peace, and more contented, than you do, usually, on other occasions? What is the meaning of such an experience? What kind of an experience is this for you, usually?

7. Grounds of fear and discomfort. By the same token, what have been the worst experiences in your life? What have been the most frightening experiences? How have you incorporated these experiences into your sense of meaning?

8. Evil and Suffering. How do you make sense out of injustice and pain suffered by innocent people in the world? Do you see any meaning or any value in suffering? How have you reconciled the suffering in your own life?

9. Cause -and-effect, freedom, and scope of human movement. Do you feel that people act and choose freely in their lives, or that they enter this world with certain aspects of their destiny already planned out for them? What do you think of the scope of free movement in your own life? Do you believe that mankind has choice or freedom in shaping its own destiny throughout history?

10. Cognitive limitations. What do you think are the boundaries (if any exist) of what man can know? What are the boundaries in terms of practical and scientific knowledge? What are the boundaries in terms of "higher realities"? Is there a possibility for something which is described by some as "God-knowledge"?

11. Death and dying. What have been your own experiences of losses, in your life? What are your feelings about dying? What are your views regarding the possibility of afterlife, or of some form of consciousness beyond the physical death?

12. Commitment and authority. To what are you committed or dedicated in this life? Are there any ideals or projects, or groups (or the like) for which you are willing (have been willing) to spend a great deal of your own energy? To what do you consider the proper place of authority in a life? Or in your own life?

SHULIK'S DATA ON "AGE SENSE"

In his cross-sectional study, Shulik chose to address the question of positive growth and change in old age, in a most direct fashion. He and his interviewers directly questioned the subjects about their own awareness of any positive change or growth which they had experiences in their very latest years. The subjects were asked the following question: "Can you indicate any significant ways in which you have changed - in your personal philosophy, your outlook upon life, or your image of yourself - specifically in the last few years, beyond the age of fifty-five?" Thirty-four of the forty subjects responded to this question. On the basis of their replies, they could be divided into roughly three equal groups, as follows:

The Group I subjects comprise the "no change" group. These were the individuals who claimed no awareness of any significant change that had occured within them or even around them in their latest years. They maintained - quite steadfastly, in some cases - that they were now quite the same, in all important respects, as they had been in earlier life.

The Group II subjects comprise the "superficial change" group. These were subjects who admitted that certain facets of their life had indeed changed, and that these changes had affected them significantly. However, in describing such change, they concentrated upon external or superficial factors which really did not constitute personal or inherent change. For example, one eighty-year-old man bitterly complained that discriminatory laws on compulsory retirement had forced him to retire at the age of sixty-seven, "at a time when I had many a good working year left in me." And two women, ages sixty-eight and seventy-two, had been widowed within the past year; they focussed upon the changes in their living circumstances caused by the deaths of their husbands. They registered their sadness, but they did not quite reach the point of describing how bereavement had altered themselves as individuals - as personalities, or as personal philosophers. Hence this group may be characterized by the statement, "Yes, there is change in myself and in my life, but it is only the change which is imposed upon me by external circumstances."

Lastly, the Group III subjects comprise the "inherent change" group. These were subjects who were fully aware of external change, but who could also articulate the ways in which

they had changed from within, even during their latest years. When questionned about such change, they readily described the ways in which their personal traits, their interests, their convictions, their basic beliefs, and their whole philosophical outlooks had been altered - especially in old age. Naturally, these are the subjects who provide the strongest support for our contention that growth and change can occur in late life. Several illustrative descriptions of Group III subjects will follow shortly.

On the basis of these three groupings, Shulik defined a variable which he called "agesense," or the degree of awareness of change occuring with old age. He treated the "agesense" measurement as an ordinal, qualitative measurement in the following sense: Subjects were rated "1," "2," or "3," if they fell, respectively, into Groups I, II, or III. The agesense variable was felt to have two distinct theoretical components: First, it was taken as being a reflection of general introspective sensitivity. Subjects who are practiced in self-observation are more likely to detect changes within themselves than subjects who shun introspection. This is the subjective facet of the "agesense" variable. There is considerable evidence suggesting that this facet of "agesense" is quite strong: The subjects' agesense ratings correlated very highly with their faith-development stage scores (Spearman rho = +0.70, N = 34, P = .001) But agesense is also thought to have an objective component: Quite simply, some subjects change with age much more rapidly than others. Hence some will have much more change to contend with - and more change to acknowledge - than others. Again, there is evidence sup-

porting the existence of this objective component: The subjects' agesense ratings correlated very highly with their chronological ages (Spearman rho = +0.36, N = 34, P = .02).[1] Hence agesense appears to be a function of two distinct theoretical variables: (a) Introspective sensitivity, and (b) the objective amount of change which actually has taken place in a life. These are two factors which, in principle, could be measured or assessed at any point of the life-cycle.

In principle, the variable "agesense" can be measured and assessed at almost any age of adolescence or adulthood. One can imagine, for example, encountering a seventeen-year-old subject who is highly sensitive and introspective, describing the great sense of personal change associated with the entry into adolescent years. Similarly, one can imagine thirty-five-year-old subjects who have relatively little sense of change as they look back upon their entry into their middle adult years. Hence the variable "agesense" is not a structural variable per se. This means that there is no universal or normal course for the unfoldment of agesense over the span of the life-cycle.

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1. Interestingly, it may be noted that there is no correlation whatsoever between chronological age and the Fowler stage-score (Spearman rho = +0.12, N = 40, P = .23) in this agency sample.

However it is interesting and important to note that Shulik did find a correlation of $\rho = +0.70$ between age sense and Fowler faith stage as well as a correlation of age sense with chronological age in his sample. The correlation suggests that there may be some growth in faith stage in the aging years or at least that there is a less structural but still positive development going on among subjects at the higher Fowler stages. To give the reader a better sense of the meaning of the finding we will present four cases who are diverse in both faith stage and in age sense.

Four subjects have been chosen for careful examination: The first subject typifies Fowler's third stage; the second, his fourth stage; the third, his fifth stage of faith development; and a fourth is a possible example of the sixth stage. These four subjects also span the full range of the three "agesense" categories, and accordingly they are good illustrations of the interesting relationship between the Fowler faith-stage and the variable "agesense".

Case Study #1: John Downs

John Downs is an interesting individual in that he clearly typifies Fowler's third stage of faith development - the "synthetic-conventional" stage. Moreover, he typifies the lowest level of agesense as well. The "synthetic-conventional" stage is a form of faith development

frequently encountered in adolescents and in young adults. Fowler believes that a great many individuals do not progress very far beyond this stage; hence it comprises a terminal stage of faith development for large numbers of people. Some of its essential characteristics are as follows: At this stage, the individual is well aware of the fact that he has certain values, opinions, and convictions. However, he does not really regard these values and convictions as being distinctly his own. Rather, he tends to feel that his faith system is that of "all regular people" - or that of "all the people in my community." He has a tendency to take his faith system as a given reality: It truly cannot be disputed, for it has an immutable sense of rightness. He has difficulty in comprehending the possibility that there are other value-systems or belief-systems different from his own. He collapses that sense of difference in a number of ways: He may view "different" systems as being genuinely wrong and therefore not worthy of further serious consideration. Or he may alternatively view "different" systems as being really the same as his own underneath. He generally does not examine the relationship between his own life-experiences and his faith-system. If something in his personal life experience seems to contradict his faith system, then he may conclude that it is his life's experience that is actually invalid - or that he has somehow misunderstood his life's experience.

Frequently, the stage-three individual takes no responsibility for justifying or rationalizing the "rightness" of the faith system. When asked to defend or justify his beliefs, he tends to point to individuals or institutions outside of himself. If he points to other individuals, he may say, "They are truly wiser or more authoritative than I am, and therefore I must defer to their opinion or

knowledge." If he points to custom, tradition, or ritual, he may say, "Well, I have to believe in thus-and-such a manner, because tradition has it that that is the way it is." In adolescence and in young adulthood, the stage-three orientation is often manifested by the highly inquisitive individual who is seeking to assimilate the basic philosophical system of his community, his religion, or his national culture. In later adulthood, stage three is often manifested by individuals who have avoided philosophical introspection - or individuals who have shied away from self-examination. But at all ages, the stage-three individual tends to view problems of philosophy, religion, or belief-systems in a relatively monolithic manner.

John Downs typified many of these qualities. This man, who was sixty-three years of age at the time of his interview, described himself as a retired teamster who had driven a truck for a living for almost twenty-five years. He had been a native of a poor, white section of Gary, Indiana, where he had attended Catholic and public schools. However, he had dropped out of high school in his sophomore year to enlist in the United States Army. He had been in the service through the last two years of the second world war, and he had been stationed for a short time in Japan. A serious health problem had forced the end of his career as a teamster, at the age of fifty-eight. Nevertheless, he regarded himself as a man who had worked very hard in life and who valued his conviction that his way of life had been intrinsically correct and rewarding. He said of his work,

> I am familiar with the Detroit-to-New England route, and I often drove Chicago-to-Detroit. When I was working for another firm for a short time, I also had a Minneapolis-Seattle run, and on another occasion a Maine-to-Florida run. I know of nothing more satisfying than getting together with some of the other drivers at a truck stop or a tavern after a long day's haul.

In other words, despite his illness and his semi-retirement, Mr. Downs still viewed himself as a teamster. When the interviewer asked Mr. Downs to describe his basic philosophical convictions and beliefs, he tended to doubt that his views could really be of very much importance. "There is really very little that I could tell you," he said; "I am really not much of a thinker; my views are quite the same as those of any teamster, or any working man.". This was his way of saying that his philosophical system was really quite unremarkable and uninteresting; moreover, it was like that of "many other people." The interviewer pressed him, nonetheless.

Mr. Downs tended to adopt a non-analytical approach to many of the philosophical problems which arose in the course of the interviewer. He admitted, for example, that modern-day society faces a great many problems, but he persisted in the belief that society generally has not changed. "Hell, there are problems today, and there were the same problems when I was a boy," he said, "and I expect that there will be the same problems forty years from now, long after we are gone." He tended to believe that there is the <u>appearance</u> of social change, but that underneath this appearance all really remains quite the same. In discussing specific social issues, Mr. Downs tended to attribute controversies and concerns to corrupt politicians:

> Since moving from the greater Chicago area to New England, I have learned that absolutely all politicians are corrupt. And so they create these issues for themselves and for their own benefit. I haven't ever heard of -

> ized that before I left the mid-west. All of this hub-bub about President Nixon, hell! Nixon was no different from Kennedy or Johnson or Eisenhower or any of the rest. And the fellas over here in our (local town) city hall are all the same ilk. And you watch and see that Jimmy Carter will show himself in the end to be exactly like all the rest of them, or I'll be very much surprised.

Mr. Downs tended to stick to this line of reasoning even when the interviewer questioned him on specific issues. For example, is there truly an energy crisis? "Of course there isn't!" he exclaimed. "It's just that some politician somewhere is making a great deal of money convincing everyone that there is!"

Mr. Downs had recently suffered a very serious illness which had almost ended his life. He had developed an extremely rare malignant tumor which had been described by his physician as a "floating tumor" - not fixed in its position - and therefore extremely difficult to excise. Several such cases had been observed prior to his, but all of those individuals had died, some of them in surgery. The tumor had weakened him to such a degree that, at the age of fifty-eight, he had been forced to retire from truck-driving. Subsequently, he enjoyed some degree of acclaim, in medical circles, after he became the first patient to survive surgery for this particular disease. The finest specialists at a well-known hospital had planned his operation with great care, and they had encouraged him to enter surgery even though they gave him less than a twenty-five percent chance of recovering. "I am somewhat famous in the medical journals, you know," he told the interviewer, "and I'm still living - on borrowed time - thanks to the very intelligent doctors at (local) hospital." The discussion of this issue led to a consideration of life's basic meaning, and thoughts about death and dying. On these subjects, Mr. Downs had the following things to say. 34

> ....I'm not now a religious man, never was, and never will be. Religion is just a lot of nonsense as I see it. As I see it, we are born, we live here, we die, and that's it. Religion gives people something to believe in, that there's something more, because they want there to be something more, but there isn't. So ....you see, I'd rather put some money down on the bar and buy myself a drink, rather than put that same money into a collection plate! Wish others would do the same, too. They'd spare themselves a lot of needless bother.

Mr. Downs indicated that these had always been his basic convictions, and that even his close brush with death, due to his unusual illness, had not changed his basic convictions. "No reason to see why an experience like that should change what I believe. That's just the way the cards fall. But I am grateful that this old body still has some life in it, if that's what you mean."

Mr. Downs tended to dismiss the interviewer's question about the basic purpose or meaning behind human life as being, essentially, a meaningless or incomprehensible question. It was, in his opinion, a question which really could not be comprehended well, let alone answered, and so it wasn't worthy of much serious reflection. Hence he answered with some humor,

> You go and ask a seventeen-year-old boy this question, and he may give you an answer or he may not, but the real answer to this question for him is some pretty young woman that he wants to take into his arms. And the pretty young woman, her answer to this question is that handsome young man. And that is how nature has made us, and that is it. ..... And (moreover), I am proud to be able to tell you that, even at the age of sixty-three, I still have an eye for pretty young woman! And so! What do you think of that! I think it's great.

In brief, Mr. Downs can present the interviewer with the outlines of a faith system, but it is, in reality, a loosely-aggregated collection of opinions or convictions which he identifies as being essentially "just the views of one common man." And, in a sense, he is right: He is not particularly reflective, but he makes no pretense of reflection.

Some of his views appear to be almost platitudes (e.g., all politic are corrupt, without exception; all political crises are merely the fabricated contrivances of corrupt politicians). But, on the other hand, the statement of a personal philosophy, for Mr. Downs, is not genuinely an analytical or introspective process. Rather, it is a process which makes him one with the community - or his perceived community of hard-working men. This is the central meaning behind Fowler's words "synthetic" and "conventional." The stage-three individual's faith system is "conventional," in that it is seen as being everyone's faith system, or the faith system of the entire community. And it is "synthetic" in that it is non-analytical; it comes as a sort of unified, monolithic wholeness. And in truth, for Mr. Downs, the discussion of values and convictions is a means of asserting his oneness with the community which he calls his own. He does not discuss values to distinguish himself, or to examine the values, or to be sure that his views are the correct one. Rather, he engages in such discussion to establish a sense of commonality or relatedness with the other person present.

A final point concerns Mr. Downs' lack of "agesense." Essentially, in spite of his serious illness and his close brush with death, Mr. Downs maintained that he hadn't changed at all in growing older. He responded to the agesense question as follows:

> I am not any different, really, I think, from what I was when I was younger. Hell! I still have an eye for pretty young women! I still enjoy a good drink! Or a political argument. I am as interested in what is going on at city hall as I ever was. Of course, I don't drink quite as much as I used to. The doc says that I oughtn't to. But I think I am quite the same. I have not changed at all.

An objective observer may disagree considerably with this assessment. It is difficult to imagine anyone going through Mr. Downs' late life experiences (especially his serious illness) without changing in some way, at least superficially. An interesting commentary was made by Mrs. Downs, who was delighted to see her husband being interviewed by a social scientist, but who also felt the need to take the interviewer aside before he left their apartment. She said,

> Don't you believe one word of it when he tells you he hasn't changed. I can't tell you how much better he is now than he used to be! He doesn't get nearly so angry any more as he used to. He is much softer. And he doesn't drink nearly so much any more as in earlier times, when he would from time to time get drunk. He doesn't drink like that any more because he'd get sick if he did.

Case Study #2: Leo Greenberg.

Leo Greenberg typifies Fowler's fourth stage of faith development, which he calls the "individuating-reflective" stage. In addition, Mr. Greenberg typifies the intermediate (Group II) level of agesense: He is willing to acknowledge that some change has entered into his life, but he denies that this change has affected his personality or his philosophy in any profound or meaningful manner. Before we examine the particulars of Mr. Greenberg's personal philosophy, let us consider the basic outlines of Fowler's fourth stage of faith development.

Stage four is that stage at which the individual begins to understand that he, himself, is responsible for developing his personal philosophical system. Whereas the stage-three individual felt that his philosophical system was "that of my community" or "that of my culture" in general, the stage-four individual progressively recognizes that his philosophical system is distinctly his own: He has to be able to explain it, understand it, and justify it to himself. Hence it is at stage four that the individual becomes a reflective, self-examining philosopher in the true sense. He no longer feels comfortable appealing to external authorities, wiser individuals, or a vague sense of tradition in justifying his values and convictions. Rather, he seeks for justification within himself, in terms of his own powers of logical reasoning, and his own interpretation of personal life experiences. He can begin to use personal experiences as a means of testing the validity of his personal philosophical system.

To a certain degree, the stage-four individual still retains some of the characteristics of stage three. For example, he continues to regard philosophical systems as integral unities, or as wholenesses. He tends to view philosophical systems - whether they be his own or those

of others - as indivisible systems: They must be either wholly accepted or else wholly rejected. Furthermore, in the course of fashioning his own personal philosophical system, the stage-four individual frequently sees himself as a seeker in quest of the one right point-of-view: He now begins to recognize the reality that there are other philosophical systems genuinely different from his own. But that which he claims as his is often endowed with an exclusive aura of rightness. This attitude is shared, to some degree, by the person at stage three. But a basic difference between the stage-three and stage-four individuals is that the former genuinely fail to understand that there are philosophical systems different from his own.

Fowler believes that the stage-four person experiences further qualitative changes in the structuring of his faith system. For example, the stage-four individual begins to understand, for the first time, that there are some very baffling philosophical questions, these being questions which are perhaps unanswerable by means of logical analysis alone. Some of these questions are as follows: What is the ultimate meaning or purpose of human existence? What is the value of human achievement in the face of seemingly inevitable "levelling" of death? Are there any purposes or meanings inherent in the suffering of seemingly innocent people? These are basic questions which often evoke existential considerations - and which can be frightening, demanding questions for all people, regardless of their stage of faith development. Fowler believes that these questions are especially interesting to individuals at stage five and six who can focus upon such considerations for extended periods, even in the face of all the feelings of uncertainty evoked by such questions. Fowler believes

that, by way of contrast, the stage-four individual cannot yet sustain a prolongued consideration of these questions without experiencing considerable anxiety. Hence he has to "collapse" these questions by finding relatively straightforward, monolithic answers for them, answers which seem to resolve them conclusively.

In summary, the stage-four individual has advanced beyond stage three, in that he recognizes that he has a personal philosophical system, and in that he recognizes his responsibility for justifying that system as the system of his own. He is somewhat sharper, or more careful, in his use of logic as he sets forth his philosophy, and he sees a meaningful relationship between personal experience and that which he believes. He also recognizes that each individual is, in a sense, a personal philosopher as he is, and that there are many different "faith systems" in the world beside his own. But the faith systems still seem as indivisible entities to him, and his own is still endowed with an aura of "intrinsic rightness" which is reminiscent of the philosophical egocentrism of stage three.

Leo Greenberg, who was seventy-two years of age at the time of his interview, typified almost all of these qualities. He had led a very interesting life: Born of poor Russian-Jewish immigrant parents, he had grown up in a lower-middle-class Boston neighborhood as the ninth of twelve children. He had fashioned a successful career for himself by virtue of his own hard work: During the early 1920's, he had attended a local college on an athletic scholarship, majoring in economics. There followed a brief administrative career with a large firm, after which he established himself privately as an investment advisor, managing the portfolios of a number of well-to-do individuals and families. This career was extremely successful and lasted for

approximately twenty years, after which time he withdrew from active consultation to begin a "mid-life career." Throughout his last fifteen years of active work, he devoted himself to humane and charitable causes. He took a salaried position with a small community hospital preparing to undergo substantial expansion. He helped to guide the hospital through its difficult period of expansion; moreover, he established voluntary and charitable services at that hospital - and at other hospitals in the immediate vicinity of his home. At the age of sixty-five, he had begun to taper off these many activities, in the process of beginning a gradual transition into retirement. However, he was still very much in demand for business and investment consultation and for consultation to charitable organizations. Of his adult life, he said,

> In a sense, I have had two careers, and perhaps this makes me different from many other people. My first career was definitely self-serving, and there is no question about that. But, luckily, I was successful, and so I could afford the luxury of my second career, which was more service-oriented or humanistic in its intent. I fully realize that this is a luxury which few people can afford. For the great majority, it is a struggle to survive adequately.

Mr. Greenberg subscribed to the credo, "a man is what a man does." This emphasis upon personal responsibility and action is one quality which distinguishes stage four from stage three: Stage four places great emphasis upon personal responsibility. Stage four also draws a careful, logical relationship between personal experience and the personal life philosophy. Stage four emphasizes not only individual responsibility, but also individual freedom of choice. Mr. Greenberg was asked by the interviewer whether he had ever contemplated the interesting philosophical distinction between free-will and determinie Did he, personally, believe in free-will? He answered as follows:

> You have to regard yourself as being free. If you do not consider yourself as being free, then you expect things to be done for you - you expect things to simply 'happen' in your life - and nothing may happen. You will never find out what you can do, what you can know, and what you can achieve. But you are free to do, to know, and to achieve. And you have to think of yourself as being free. Not to ask, 'What can happen?' but to ask instead, 'What can I make happen?'

This interesting philosophical tension between the two polar issues of free-will and determinism is thereby resolved. Mr. Greenberg recognizes that here is a bipolar issue, a philosophical problem. He resolves it by determining that one of the two poles is correct, whereas the other is quite wrong. Hence the stage four approach to questions of value, meaning, and philosophy, which is typified by the attitude, "There is generally one correct answer to each questior

Mr. Greenberg could capably and articulately outline the basic values which had been important to him throughout his adult life. He had valued hard work and competence (these being qualities which he shared, incidentally, with Mr. John Downs, our case study in stage three). He had valued altruism and charity, and he had pursued these values through his extensive volunteer work in his "second career." Moreover, he had cherished the values of justice and fairness, pursuing these ideals through his work with civil rights organizations and the civil liberties union. Nevertheless, there was a definite quality of "immutable rightness" to his own personal philosophical system. Mr. Greenberg seemed to believe that all individuals who were exposed to experiences like his own would, inevitably, develop values like his own. Moreover, he indicated to the interviewer that he had never questionned or doubted these values, and that he could not imagine any set of circumstances which would lead him to question

these values. He realized that his were values not universally shared by all individuals. "However," he pointed out, "I have been perhaps more fortunate than many other people, and so perhaps I have had more freedom to develop such a philosophy as I have."

The emphasis upon personal responsibility and personal authority is unmistakable in the stage-four faith system. Here, Mr. Greenberg draws a very sharp line of distinction between stage-four thinking and stage-three thinking - taking care to reject the latter for him self, personally. On the subject of religious worship, he says:

> (I have discovered that) people are religions, generally for (one of two reasons). First, there are those people who believe....out of a sense of fear (or obligation). They worship because they believe something dreadful is going to happen to them if they do not do so. They will be damned, or cursed, or ruined..... (Then) there are those who believe not because they fear, but because they do genuinely wish to strive after enlightenment. .... They want to know: What is God really like? What does God want of us? What is the good life that we can lead? Not only do they want to know, but they haven't the fear of questionning. .... Now, let me ask you this: How many people are (of the second type)....? How many in any faith, whether Christian, or Jewish, or any other? .... In my personal opinion, very, very few. Perhaps a handful in the entire world.

Hence stage four takes a step in the direction of genuine individual inquiry, and in this regard it distinguishes itself from the previous stage. But the subtle egocentrism of "inevitable rightness" in one's own personal philosophy still persists, thus distinguishing stage four from stage five.

Let us end this case study by considering Mr. Greenberg's level of "agesense" carefully. He falls quite clearly into the intermediate group: He readily acknowledges that there are changes which have occured in his life, and that these have been important changes. But these changes still stand outside the realm of his basic personality

or his intrinsic life philosophy. He notes,

> There is a constant need to adjust to change, not only in old age, for that matter, either, but throughout your entire life. When you are older you are not quite as strong, physically, as you were when you were younger. Then there are other changes that have to be taken into consideration as well: For most people, there is forced retirement at age sixty-five or sixty-seven. For others there is the change in the family: The children grow up and leave, and they start families of their own; and there is widowhood, too. But the successful, happy person is resilient and adaptive throughout all of life.

This description of old age is somewhat depersonalized, in that Mr. Greenberg retreats from a focus upon himself and considers the general subject of extrinsic change throughout life. But when the interviewer pressed him for a more personal answer to the question, he tended to deny that he, himself, as a personality had undergone any change. Moreover, he added that he was happy to remain essentially the same person he had been for many years, for he found his high level of activity very satisfying and rewarding. Hence he did not deny personal change as blatantly as did Mr. John Downs, but he still tended to deny that the changes in his life had touched upon the very core of his being.

Case Study #3: Brandon Stallworth.

The third case study to be considered here typifies Fowler's fifth stage of faith development - and the highest degree of "age-sense" as well. Brandon Stallworth, a research scientist, presents a very complex and well-articulated system of personal philosophy. Again, as in the previous two cases, let us consider the general characteristics of the stage-five faith system before we examine Dr. Stallworth's personal philosophy in close detail.

Stage five represents a number of specific advances over the

philosophical system of stage four. Whereas the stage-four philosophical system was subtly egocentric, the stage-five system is effectively "decentered." This is to say that the stage-five individual is no longer so constrained that he must regard his own system of personal philosophy as being "essentially correct." He is highly introspective and highly self-conscious as a personal philosopher. But at the same time, he is relatively secure in considering several different philosophical systems simultaneously. In a sense he does not need to defend himself against "alien" philosophical systems, as the stage-four individual does, for fear that the "alie" system will point out some deficiency in his own way of thinking. The stage-five individual can consider faith systems which stem from cultures, communities, and life histories entirely alien to his own personal experience. He can empathize, far more flexibly and far more freely, with individuals from different cultural and philosophical backgrounds.

The stage-five individual is described by Fowler as having a larger capacity for sustaining awareness of certain existential paradoxes. Existential paradoxes are inherent in the reality that certain global questions can be asked, without any certainty of definite answers. These are questions which may, indeed, defy logical analysis: Several such questions, considered in the previous section, focussed upon the free-will/determinism polarity, the meaning of human life in the face of its frailty and shortness, and the puzzle of suffering accrued to apparently innocent people. The stage-four individual felt a need to press toward definitive and conclusive answers to these questions, as though it is somehow "dangerous" to leave them without ans

The stage-five person, on the other hand, does not feel any such urgent need: He can consider suchlike questions for an extended period of time. It is as though he has developed a degree of philosophical courage greater than that manifested by people at stage four. He is also willing to embrace the disquieting possibility tha these profound philosophical questions cannot be answered within the span of a human lifetime. The individual at stage five is far more sensitive to the limitations of knowledge than is the individual at stage four. The stage-four person often tends to believe that the human capacity to know is unlimited.

The stage-five person differs from individuals at earlier stages in yet another way: He is somewhat more sympathetic toward individuals at all levels of philosophical development than are the others. For example, the stage-four individual frequently reacts to people at lower stages with a feeling of discomfort: He is sometimes offended by their inability to take a greater sense of persona responsibility for their beliefs and convictions. Similarly, the stage-three person is sometimes offended by individuals at lower stages; he feels that their ignorance of social conventions and customs renders them helpless and vulnerable. The stage-five individual, on the other hand, recognizes that his relatively complex faith system sets him apart from many other people around him, but he does not find the difference quite so discomforting or offensive. Sometimes, in the forms of philosophical reasoning found at earlier developmental stages, he recognizes elements of his own past. Not only does he see himself as a philosophical "seeker" involved in a continuous process of growth, but he can see others in the same light

Fowler hastens to point out that the stage-five individual is

not necessarily the happiest of all people. He is far more sensitive to the extremes of human experience, and this sensitivity enables him to be more empathic. But his empathy renders him more vulnerable to emotional pain. Individuals at earlier developmental stages can shield themselves from certain forms of emotional pain by denying that such pain exists, or by experiencing less empathy. However, this form of defense is not available to the stage-five person; he has to protect himself in some other way.

Brandon Stallworth typifies stage five in a number of ways. This physical scientist, who was sixty-six years of age at the time of his interview, had enjoyed a long career of teaching and research at a major university, and he was in the process of preparation for his retirement, which was several months away. He had cultivated a very wide range of interests: As a young man, prior to entering graduate school, he had worked as a reporter for a newspaper in a large city, calling this experience "the best over-all graduate course of training that I ever took in my entire life." Subsequently, he had thoroughly enjoyed his academic career. "I think that my students found me a demanding but thorough teacher," he said. He had been more than an ivory-towar academic: He had also been active in politics in his local community, twice running unsuccessfully for public office, and regularly participating in the town meeting and in a variety of voluntary service organizations. Furthermore, because of the nature of his scientific research, he had been asked to serve the Federal government several times as a member of advisory panels. He was, in fact, involved with one such panel at the time of his interview. "This is perhaps the most interesting thing that I am allowed to do," he said of the advisory panel. In brief, Dr. Stallworth had led an extremely active

and diversified life.

Fowler calls stage five the "paradoxical-consolidative" faith. The word "paradox" implies that the stage-five individual is interested in philosophical or existential paradoxes, and that he can sustain his interest in such questions without being frightened away by them. The word "consolidative" suggests that, in fashioning his faith system, the stage-five person makes a genuine attempt to incorporate his awareness of existential paradox into his philosophical thinking in a sincere manner. Dr. Stallworth clearly manifests this form of "paradoxical consolidative" thinking in discussing several issues. First, in describing his scientific research, he noted that the philosophical issue of free-will/determinism is of interest to him. He noted further that he had to function, in his laboratory, as a determinist. "Moreover," he said, "I think that any experimental scientist who does this kind of research has to do so." The interviewer then asked him whether he deemed himself a determinist outside the laboratory as well. He said:

> Now, here is a very interesting point. When I am working in the laboratory, I have to subscribe to an assumption which is, how shall we describe it? The assumption of scientific materialism. And according to that assumption, the physical world is a perfectly functioning mechanism which can be understood in terms of scientific laws. ..... But in my personal life, on the other hand, I cannot subscribe to that. In personal life, one has to make decisions. One has to choose values and convictions. ..... To decline to do so is tantamount to a certain form of mental illness, is it not? When I step into a voting booth, I am making a decision about a given candidate for office. I have to regard myself as someone who can choose the more capable and competent candidate. And, for that matter, even when I decide what I would like to order for dinner, I see myself as someone who is free to choose! (Laugh.) .... There is a kind of ... dualism in this, then, isn't there? .... In the laboratory, then, I function as a determinist. But outside the laboratory, I function as a, how to describe it? As a modified Kantian!

Dr. Stallworth treats this issue articulately and sensitively. He is showing us that he can maintain two perspectives at the same time, with

no tremendous sense of discomfort. And yet, the two perspectives do seem to be mutually exclusive of one another, in a certain sense.

A similar capacity for maintaining awareness of paradox is displayed in his discussion of organized religion. He makes the following remarks:

> I haven't anything to do any longer with organized religion, myself. I left the congregation when I was in my late teens, and this did not come as any kind of sudden conversion or unconversion experience, but rather I gradually drifted away from it. ..... I now sympathize with other people, the vast majority of people, I would say, who do feel that they need to belong to an organized faith. I think that indeed it is something that they do need. They need a system of values which explains the world to them and which describes their position vis à vis a larger force which is responsible for events. I, personally, am capable of living within a system of personal philosophy that does not call for that kind of external support. But I understand (the others), and I appreciate them, and I sympathize with them. And I think it would be a terribly cruel and arrogant thing to try to do to them, to take (their religious faith) away from them.

This passage embodies Dr. Stallworth's sense of empathy: He, himself, is not religious or devotional, but he has a very sensitive understanding of others who do need to be religious or devotional, and in a sense he wants to be protective of their need for religious faith. This protectiveness, moreover, does not seem patronizing or condescending.

Dr. Stallworth highly values understanding among different types of peoples. For example, he deplores segregation according to race, or according to religious belief, or according to age. At the time of his interview, he was taking a great interest in several large apartment houses being constructed in his community specifically for the elderly. He objected to these apartment houses because they struck him as being "geriatric ghettoes." He said:

> It is an extremely wonderful thing to <u>have</u> to be exposed to people who are different from ourselves. Certainly there will be friction, or more friction, at any rate, in such situations than you might have in an entirely homogeneous community. But on the other hand it is so very stimulating. As (someone who has been interested in health sciences), I actually think it is more beneficial, physically more healthy. .... Now, these housing projects for the elderly are an excellent case in point. They are beautiful buildings: They are spacious and comfortable, and the elderly people, who are generally confined to fixed incomes, will be able to rent them for a fraction of what they would have to pay if these apartments weren't subsidized. But think for a moment about some of the implications of a 'geriatric ghetto': The older people in there will be confined to social contacts within their generation. Their scope of vision will become increasingly narrow. This has the effect of making them too self-centered and too egocentric - even insidiously - whether they know it or not. A particular elderly woman may say for example that the racket of children playing noisily outside her window is disturbing. But when I think of it, I think it is <u>good</u> that she should have to listen to the racket of noisy children at play. Good, so that she doesn't forget what that sounds like!

Dr. Stallworth makes a similar remark about cultural and religious diversity as well Referring to a colleague who followed the Orthodox Jewish dietary restrictions very carefully, Dr. Stallworth said:

> I have to respect his diligence in following (so carefully restricted a dietary regime).....(but) I do not see how I could possibly follow (such a restrictive regime) myself. I have many colleagues and friends who are very different from myself. I admire that difference and I want to know more about them. But this is somewhat more difficult to do if I can't share lunch or dinner with them. And this is one reason why I, myself, could never follow a restrictive dogma of orthodoxy. Orthodoxies have many advantages to them, but this, definitely, is a disadvantage.

Hence Dr. Stallworth's interest in diversity is more than a naive form of eclecticism: He believes that people have a great deal to learn from one another, and that they can learn even more about themselves if they are exposed to others who have emerged from different backgrounds. He noted also, in this vein, that he was grateful for as a newspaper reporter was to

graduate school. Calling this "the best post-graduate course I ever took," he also said, "Some of my colleagues are scientists only - and scientists thoroughly. And whereas they are highly competent in their work, they should expose themselves more regularly to people who work, think, and act differently."

In summary, these are some of the ways in which Dr. Stallworth typifies Fowler's fifth stage: He is interested in human diversity and in dialogue. He readily takes the point-of-view of personal philosophies drastically different from his own (e.g., those of the sincere religious believers). And he sustains awareness of paradoxical philosophical issues (e.g., the free-will/determinism polarity) without shrinking back from them in fear, or without having to "defend himself" against stark uncertainty with rigidly-defended answers.

Dr. Stallworth's degree of "agesense" is also very high. He typifies the greatest degree of sensitivity to internal, personal change with old age. Two of his remarks may be taken as prototypical statements of the highest level of agesense. The first occurs as his answer to the question, "In what ways have you changed with age?"

> ....Now, this is a most fascinating observation. I have often thought of my changing nature in old age in this way: This is the human body in which we reside, being a sort of ship, if you will. And these two eyes, through which we view the world around us, are rather like two port-holes of the ship. Now as I have grown older, I have observed with great interest the changes that characterize my physical appearance. For I definitely do not make the same appearance that I made at twenty-five, or, for that matter, at forty-five either. Yet the most amazing impression is that this being, this indefinable 'me' who is looking out at the world through these two port-holes that we call eyes, does indeed feel as though he is the same 'me' that looked out at the world at the ages of twenty-five and forty-five.

Yet despite the fact that it is the same "indefinable me" who is looking out at the world, Dr. Stallworth also recognizes the reality

that this "me" has also changed. He describes that change as follows:

> (In my work, for one thing,) I am no longer as rigorous as I was when I was younger. I will attend a colloquium and listen to a younger man presenting a paper, nowadays, and I no longer care whether his rigorous mathematical treatment of the problem is accurate or whether the minutae of his presentation are well polished. (I would have been more interested in such details when I was much younger.) But on the other hand, I am far more interested in the broader implications of the presentation. What is its philosophical impact? Is it worth the effort that is required to assimilate the details? Does it make a broad contribution, even if technically perfect and well-polished? What I think I mean to say is that, as I have grown older, I have grown less analytical. But I have also grown increasingly comprehensive or syntehtic. And this I value as a positive change.

He has, then, changed as a person in this manner: He is interested more in breadth and depth and less concerned with detail. He now prefers to have a sweeping overview of the question at hand - whether that question be a problem in his work, or a political issue, or a concern of his personal life. Hence another intriguing paradox: He recognizes that he has, indeed, changed with age, even though he does still feel that the "me" looking out at the world through his eyes is quite the same entity that it has always been.

In sum, Dr. Stallworth is an excellent, articulate example of faith-stage five and agesense level three.

Case Study #4: Andrea Simpson.

Our next case, Andrea Simpson, is of particular interest because her orientation raises the question of the possible existence of a sixth stage of faith orientation. Fowler's sixth stage explicitly invokes charismatic examples of saintliness including Martin Luther King,

Mahatma Gandhi, Abraham Lincoln, Dag Hammarskjold and Mother Teresa of Culcutta (Fowler 1978, p. 89). As the description of Stage 6 in Table 2 suggests, Fowler's stage description is, first, one of charismatic exemplification of agape. Second, the language used to describe the stage comes from Christian theology. Fowler's concept of faith is a Christian, and especially Protestant Christian, concern. Eastern religions as well as liberalized Western religions are unconcerned with faith as a virtue or as the center of a man's life. They also may not make agape the central characteristic of the fully spiritually developed person.

Because Miss Simpson is not a charismatic exemplar of agape and faith her status in the Fowler faith scheme is uncertain. She does, however, seem to be a possible example of our conception of a sixth stage of religious orientation, the stage we metaphorically termed "Stage 7" in Kohlberg (1973). In Chapter 9 of Volume I we discussed the "stage" again where we illustrated the concept with the example of Marcus Aurelius. Marcus Aurelius was not a charismatic example of agape activated by faith, but his actions and words corresponded to our conceptions of a highest stage of religious orientation.

The religious sixth stage we hypothesized in Volume I, Chapter 9, is like our moral sixth stage, a direction, or a dynamic endpoint of development, giving philosophic direction to the stage schema, rather than a Piagetian structure found in longitudinal study. Not only do we lack the longitudinal data for such a claim, but it seems to represent more an optional "spiritual" track of human development, taken at or after moral stage 5, rather than a higher direction of development for all human beings, as we believe is true for our moral stages.

Our description of Andrea Smith will present first, her life history, or her "spiritual journey," and then her current views on the issues

covered in the faith interviews. She was given the faith interview at the age of 78.

Among all of Shulik's forty subjects, Andrea Simpson was the only individual who described her life in terms of a deliberate, self-conscious spiritual search. She was born of well-to-do parents in a comfortable suburb of Boston. Miss Simpson's mother was a Unitarian, her father an agnostic. She attended private schools and a highly-regarded woman's college, preparing for a career as a public school teacher. Ultimately, she taught for several years in two large eastern cities and one western city, but eventually she ended her teaching career in order to pursue several shorter careers of a more unusual nature. She supported herself for a number of years by functioning as a prototypical "occupational therapist" in a psychiatric hospital - at a time when the professional role of the occupational therapist was not as well defined or accepted as it as generally is today. She worked also as an artist and as a writer. She had published one very short book at the time of her interview,

and she was at that time preparing another short book for publication. These little volumes were somewhat autobiographical in nature but also spiritual and philosophical in tone, describing some of her reflections upon a long life of spiritual seeking.

Miss Simpson had been affiliated with several religious groups as part of her lifelong spiritual search. As a girl of 12 she affiliated with her mother's Unitarian church. For her, joining the church "was a religious experience to me and I felt as if I were going to be pure and holy for the rest of my life". During the college years she left Unitarianism and came to know, and affiliate with, the Quakers largely because of her pacifism and opposition to World War I. She says:

> "During World War I, someone sent the Unitarian minister to see me because of the person's concern that I was a pacifist and was talking to these boys who were getting ready to go in the service. The minister came and I felt sorry for him because I think he knew I was right and he was in a false position for him to try and tell what attitude to take to World War I. I expected the Unitarian church to hold out and send out a clarion call that this thing is wrong. But they all went along except a few pacifists and that's where I came to know the Quakers, God love them."

While her moral principles and concerns dictated the shift in church affiliation from Unitarianism to the Quakers, Andrea Simpson's religious concerns were, in her mind, not so much ethical in nature as they were esthetic. This was reflected by her painting, her college studies and her occupation of art-teacher. But it also meant something more. "My religion became a search for beauty. I think I've always been a religious person, but in those years I had to stop calling myself a churchgoer. I didn't go to church for years and years except to please my mother at Christmas and Easter. It meant a great deal to her and I wouldn't have hurt her feelings by not going."

After these years as an artist and art-teacher in which "beauty was my ideal" she faced a sense of despair about her life in her forties. She realized that she would not marry because she had, by this time, limited her exposure to suitors too narrowly. By her forties, she felt entrapped wihin her singleness.

> I muffed my emotional or sex life. It was ill-starred because I am sure I had a father complex which caused me to reject those dear early fellows who did me the favor to love me. I was looking for a man as gifted and exciting as my father but without his hazards. This I never found. I had unfortunate relationships. In lonely periods I made some mistakes. I was trying to handle something that was too much for me.

The second source of her despair in her forties was her brother's psychosis and prolonged hospitalization which she felt as an unjust affliction. Of her brother's affliction, she says, "I can go back to my own experience with the problem of suffering. If there ever was a pure sinless soul, it was my

brother Andrew. Why he had to have a life like that, I've got to solve if I'm going to believe in a good God, a kind God."

She visited her brother in a state psychiatric hospital, but the visits were an experience "that was too much for me". Of her later, more sustained efforts she says "I availed myself of psychiatry when I was trying hold myself together, over working on that terrible ward with Andrew. These people were lying around in the nude masturbating. I had dreams that frightened me that I was in a mental hospital and everybody was mental".

In a state of uncertainty and conflict she moved to southern California where she had what she calls a "nervous breakdown", went into a form of psychotherapy and became involved with the Vedanta society and with Krishnamurti. From the Vedanta experience she learned "the Oriental view, that it doesn't matter what you call it, God, or Jesus, or Cosmic Flow, or Reality, or love. And what you learn from that source will not tie your life in creeds that separate you from your fellow man. I found with Krishnamurti that the last thing he wanted was to get anybody to be a follower."

Andrea Simpson felt the exposure to Oriental philosophy helped her to get over her "nervous breakdown". However the passive comtemplative thrust of Oriental philosophy she eventually found limiting in terms of her need to do something for her brother.

> That was one of the things that brought me back to Christianity: the Hindu way of religion wasn't enough to actively help sick people. A Christian leader said to me, I told him beauty was my ideal, and he said, "Beauty can be pagan; where in that way of life is righteousness." And that gave me the whole of religion in one word. Religion means re - back again, ligio - to bind, the word religion means to bind again and righteousness rightly understood means coming back to the binding with other people."

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She continues, "The undercurrent of my whole life in California was to get back to Andrew as soon as I was well enough to tackle work in a mental hospital." Accordingly she returned East and renewed her affiliation with the Quakers.

> "I decided the thing for me to do was to take up residence in the town of Andrew's hospital and work hard with Andrew and see if I could get him out of there." "That experience was very trying for a raw recruit when I wasn't too far from a nervous smash-up myself. The ward was shocking to see and they said 'There's your brother'. And here was a little old man all bent over sitting there and I got down on my knees in front of him so I could look into his face and he saw who it was and I saw a smile right out of heaven, a smile of an angel. He'd found his old sister."

She goes on:

"... this is probably what you want to know, my work in the mental health field. Because of my brother, my darling brother Andew who broke when he was seventeen. This is one reason I say the path chose me. I never would have gone near a mental hospital if I hadn't had somebody I loved who got stuck in it. But it was one of the threads of my life and I have done a great deal of work in that field. I started at the State Hospital where Andrew was a patient. I got permission to have a course there. I taught creative rhythms, and I went out on the wards with my little hand wind victrola with folk dance music. And I worked with the patients with no background in mental health training at all; I was scared to death that somebody was going to come along and say what do you think you're doing with these people. They used to come, nurses and supervisors and things used to come and watch what I was doing. And finally the head of therapy, came to watch. I couldn't see his face because he sat behind me. I had a circle of these women, about fifteen, and we did our thing, big physical movements, rhythmic things that I developed. And I was really in a cold sweat, I didn't know if it was going to be approved or disapproved. Dr. R. it was, had brought a head nurse with him. They were both behind me, and when the thing was over he shook my hand and said Miss S., you have done a most remarkable thing with these women. Well, it took an awful long time for me to know that the people who came to watch my group came to watch because they thought it was remarkable, not because they were going to throw me out. I got permission that ANDREW should come to this group, the only fellow..."

After her work at the hospital she developed another area of service. When asked "In the present what makes life worth living for you?" she replied

> "I have what I call my old age career. I joined the Quakers when I came back from California. I've always been concerned about the race question. In 1952, I went to a national conference on race relations by the Quakers, about a third were black. I came back burning with zeal to do something about the miserable situation between the races. We started a little race relations group at Friends Meeting. A black friend wrote she was unable to get her child in a summer camp and that started my efforts in that field."

When asked, "At the present time what activities most engage you?" she responded:

> "Last year I published this little book, and I'm finishing the sequel to it. The theme of the first book tells people that when people get to that middle aged period they ought not to be discouraged, that they can use their feelings as a clue about what to do about picking up their lives. I had a problem with the philosophic material that I had developed that went with that. I was persuaded by sympathetic critics that I had two books, not one. The start of that second book was written out in the woods, in Nature, in California. I'm working this winter completely rewriting the first chapters. Then I'll see if I can't get a commercial publisher. That's what I would say is my chief interest right now. My watching over Andrew at the State hospital is a very real and continuing concern. Looking after the students who live with me is another one. I'm pretty badly off with arthritic hips as I don't go out hardly at all. But I have a fascinating life right here. Since I've been so lame I haven't been going to the Friends Meeting or any other church.
>
> I don't look at myself as a failure because I'm a sick old lady, which in a sense I am. I think I'm just beginning a new chapter of spiritual development, and the challenge is how well you can handle the problems of advanced age. I've had two operations for osteoarthritis and a third one coming up. I've been able to write the second book because I can do it when I'm able to. If I didn't have this like a spring in a mountainside bubbling up. I don't identify with my body. Because my body is going down doesn't mean I'm going down."

Clearly, whatever her stage, Andrea Simpson exemplifies the idea of the aging person as a philosopher. In her old age, for the first time, she tries to set down her philosophy as a book while she feels she is still developing spiritually or philosophically. By her college years she seems to have reached a Stage 5 or postconventional level of moral judgment, and she had translated it into

action in her pacifist activities in World War I, without support from her family or her church. Her spiritual journey, however, did not become serious, nor did it separate from aesthetic ideal of her work as an art teacher, until she had a "midlife crisis" in her forties. Coming out of this despair, she alternated between the two traditions of inward mysticism, of the Eastern contemplative kind, and the Western Quaker ideal combining inward spiritual union with God with active love and service for other human beings. Progressively she felt the need to blend these two orientations. In this blend she has tried to integrate an inward meditation with acts of loving service, for example, the "call" which came from her brother's affliction.

She distinguishes meditation from prayer:

> "I think it's awfully important to distinguish between prayer and meditation. You have to go very slowly into the spiritual realm or you're just sitting here like the King in Hamlet 'My words fly up but my thoughts remain below.' One way is to go over all the things in life you are grateful for. And anything of very great beauty in Nature is a threshold to the spiritual realm. And you have to learn to forgive yourself and the other fellows before you can pray. But meditation is quite different from prayer. You stop using your mind, deliberately like a flower that opens itself to the sun. And you let these dimensions in."

In speaking of this dimension she uses words reminiscent of another poem of Wordsworth,[1] which like our prefatory poem, speaks of the experience of adulthood and aging.

1 Lines composed a few miles above Tintern Abbey

> For I have learned
> To look at Nature, not as in the hours
> Of thoughtless youth; but hearing oftentimes
> The still sad music of humanity, or ample power
> To chasten and subdue, And I have felt
> A presence that disturbs me with the joy
> Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused,
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
> And the round ocean and the living air ,
> And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
> A motion and a spirit, that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things.

She says:

> "Whatever dimension you call it that is not just overhead in the sky but in the heart and the whole surrounding world, it's in everyone. So you open yourself to that which surrounds totally and is totally within. And then you just wait and listen. Do your best to keep the channel unblocked and you open. I like the metaphor of a rive flowing, the springs, the joyous love. The ideas you get then you do well to incorporate in your life."

After her mid-life despair, Andrea Simpson began having these experiences she calls "openings". She says,

> "William James clarifies that people have religious experiences that are openings. And it does something to their personal lives. It will make them more understanding of people. More aware of their oneness, not only with people but all of life."

We can call Andrea Simpson's experiences mystical experiences because their essence is the feeling of union with all of Being. In the theistic tradition of the Quakers, it is union with a personal God and with that part of God which is in every person. In the pantheistic natural law tradition of Marcus Aurelius and Spinoza it is the experience "of the union of the mind with all of Nature." In the Indian mystical tradition it is the union of the individual's consciousness with pure Being rather than with either a personal or a pantheistic God.

In these experiences, Andrea Simpson in middle age developed the ability and courage to serve her brother and his fellow-inmates. In her old age, it "is a spring bubbling up" which prevents her from feeling "that because my body is going down doesn't mean I'm going down."

In our ninth chapter in Volume I, we stressed that the configuration of a hypothetical sixth stage of religious orientation is not simply the having of mystical experiences, experiences which may be induced by drugs or Yogic-meditation exercises, or by pentecostal group ritual. In reference to our sixth stage, we stressed, as did William James, that these mystical experiences

were usually preceded by experiences of despair, guilt, a sense of the suffering and injustice of the world, a divided self. We also stressed that these experiences were followed by, or associated with, a new structure of belief. On the ethical side, as Andrea Simpson says, it makes one "more understanding of people," more tolerant and forgiving, more ready to serve from a sense of common humanity.

On the metaphysical or theological side, there is an at least partially attained identification with an infinite or cosmic perspective.

As stated in our earlier chapter,

> "In religious writing the movement to "Stage 7" starts with despair. Such despair involves the beginning of a cosmic perspective. It is when we begin to see our lives as finite from some more infinite perspective that we feel despair. This meaninglessness of our lives in the face of death is the meaninglessness of the finite in the face of the infinite. The resolution of the despair which we call "Stage 7" represents a continuation of the process of taking a more cosmic perspective whose first phase is despair. In despair we are the self seen from the distance of the cosmic or infinite. In the state of mind we term "Stage 7" we identify ourselves with the cosmic or infinite perspective itself, we value life from its standpoint. There is a shift from figure to ground. What is ordinarily background becomes foreground and the self is no longer figure to the ground. We sense the unity of the whole and ourselves as part of that unity. This experience, often treated as a mere rush of mystic feeling, is at "Stage 7" associated with a structure or ontological and moral conviction."

This structure of conviction Andrea Simpson describes as follows:

We start by seeking a power that's greater than yourself. If we agree that such a power can possibly exist , then we can go ahead. I don't think anybody could possibly fail to recognize that there is a power beyond themselves, when they just look out at the scene of their own neighborhood, to say nothing of the cosmos. .... I don't think it matters a bit what you call (this power). The Quakers call it 'the light within.' I think that some people are so fed up with the word 'God' that you can't talk to them about it. So, then, why talk to them about 'God'? Call it 'Reality'....or 'Cosmic Flow' or 'Love.' And nobody can tell another about it. It has to come from within the individual; it is everyone's inheritance. .... It is within every mind regardless of whether people call themselves atheists or agnostics. If by reason of their conditioning they have had a bad break of introduction to this subject, they have turned against it.... You can know a person who has had some genuine religious experience by what it has done to his personal life. Because there isn't any question in the world but that it will affect the personal lives. It will make them more understanding of all people, more aware of their oneness - not only (the oneness) of all people but of all of life.

Andrea Simpson endeavours to see the existence of death, suffering, and injustice from a cosmic or infinite perspective through using the Vedantic metaphors of reincarnation and Karma, the scientific ideas of evolution, and the more personalist ideas of the Quakers.

Well, I can go back to my own experience with my brother, If there ever were a pure, sinless human soul, it was my brother. Why he had to have a life like this, I don't know. I said to myself, 'I've got to solve (this riddle) if I'm going to believe in a good God, a kind God.' And I came out of it more or less in this way: Human life is but a brief moment in eternity. (In college) I studied astronomy. You get a broadened vista if you study astronomy. Your perspective opens out to absolutely incredible degrees. (And I have also studied) anthropology, where you get some idea of the development of the human being on

this planet earth. So I decided that a human being's life was his moment in eternity. It may be (the purpose of) William's life (to serve as) the cocoon stage, to use a figure of speech, in his evolving into a spiritual butterfly. It's a very telling metaphor, because if you put it together with the thought that a man is but a moment in eternity, maybe this is but William's moment in the cocoon. I have developed a sense of that, and should I somewhere meet William along the pathway of God, William will have his moment, and I may see him come rushing with wings. So that fixed the puzzle of William for me. And I can't but feel that all the suffering people of the world, all the people who are starving to death, will have their time, and their time will come.

Old and infirm, how does Andrea Simpson contemplate issues of death and dying? She says:

"People are awfully concerned about death nowadays. It's a curious thing with the world in such a mess. People are so discouraged that they're trying to make sure what they're going to think on that great subject. The way I've handled it in the little philosophy book ~~of mine~~ is that people have an awfully limiting idea about death. They think that life and death are a pair of opposites. You come into this life this is where you make your entrance and you make your exit from this material place and that's death. But <u>life</u> it's just something that's contained in the hands of life.

(Interviewer) You mean in exiting from a material plane ~~do~~ we go to a spiritual plane?

I don't think it's necessary to know, you can't know. It doesn't bother me because I have faith that life is good, and like the ever-returning spring something will go on.

(Interviewer) Are you inclined to believe in something like reincarnation?

Well, reincarnation is a fascinating idea that makes some sense because you see around you people who are the greenest grass and there are wise old souls that have been travelling. I think you recognize readily the people who are beyond you, that you can study with. We seem to be halfway between the people who are ahead of us and the people that are still coming. ~~I~~ I see myself as a hand in both directions, to the people ahead of me and the people that are struggling along and haven;t had the life experience I've had, that are younger and perhaps terribly confused and need a hand. I think it's terribly important not only to give what help we can but not to feel that we are doing it. If you give love and sustain a joyous attitude you've probably helped a lot more than if you've preached. They will be helped because in a sense love is God and if you give love, you give something much more than yourself."

Of Andrea Simpson's view of death, we may say first that it does not depend upon definitive, literal notions of personal immortality of the soul as in either the Christian doctrine of a hereafter or the Eastern view of reincarnation. But both are useful metaphors to her. As these views are held by persons at the conventional levels of faith they are more egocentrically centered on the survival of the self and of loved ones than in Andrea Simpson's view. Moreover, we may say that Miss Simpson's view of death dialectically and paradoxically resolves the ultimate polarities found at Stage 5, such as the polarity between life and death. Her resolution is not a definite theological view of an after life but an experience of the unity of life as a whole.

She says:

> "I would say that one of the things that has come to me immediately in the last few days is that this Cosmic Flow, which is God, call it what you will, is the life back of every cell in the body. It's a nice metaphor, the river in the flow, the healing love of God is flowing through me. If you are 78 and arthritic. But it doesn't matter where you are physically, if you're sick or well, the Reality, the actual life flows through you at every moment. Consequently you can be creative to your last breath. Just let this thing flow through you and know it flows through the other person. And peace comes."

If Andrea Simpson's religious orientation allows her to face disease and death without either denial or despair, the experience of death was also in a sense the beginning of her spiritual journey.

We mentioned as causes of her spiritual quest, her loneliness and despair over ever finding a male life companion and her sense of the injustice and suffering of her brother's condition. Even more relevant was the experience of her mother's death.

"You asked me what stirred me from being stuck on the idea that beauty was the end of all and started my searching. My mother's death was the first thing. I was very attached to my mother. I used to go home for weekends to be with my mother. She was wrapped up in humane education for children when she found I wouldn't let her make me into an old age career for her. I had to be independent and she learned that the hard way but went ahead with her own career. She became involved in care of animals and was an anti-vivisectionist.

The drugs for pneumonia were just being developed but she died of pneumonia. She wouldn't let them give her the drugs that would have pulled her out of it because she believed it was a toxin taken from animals. In a way she died for her cause. The ground shook under my feet when I lost my mother. While I was closing up the house and living there a while, I said 'I'm going to start my book while mother is still close to me'. And I did and got myself ready to go to California. Something then took me back to church but I had no desire to go back to the Unitarian church and I was in a search [for] something different and I found it at first in the Vedata society and Krishnamurti."

Andrea Simpson's search, then, began in the experiences of death and loss, and in the experiences of her brother's suffering. Her development led to a "stage" which allowed sustained effort to help the suffering of her brother and of others as well as allowing her a calm and creative response to disease and her own impending death. Central to this transformation were experiences of search for a non-egocentric cosmic or infinite perspective and felt states of union with ultimate being.

Love and Justice at "Stage 7"

Having described Andrea Simpson as an example of Fowler's sixth faith stage, and as an example of our sixth religious stage-orientation, we can better clarify why, in the past, we called it a seventh stage. The essence of our sixth moral stage is a rational universalization of the claims or duties of justice. A sixth stage leaves unanswered the great existential questions including the question of why one ought to be moral. The "answer" to these questions cannot be given within a rational logic of justice, of

balancing the claims of individual egos. These existential questions lead in the direction of a more contemplative, mystical perspective. On the ethical side this perspective may lead more to a universalizing love, or agape, than to an elaboration of rational principles of justice. For this ethic it may be sufficient to render to Caesar that which is Caesar's (i.e., the organization or justice structure of society) in order to render to God that which is God's (i.e., personal acts of sacrificial love). This, at least, is the outline which emerges from the Christian tradition, and from Andrea Simpson's development. This outline is more universal than Christian orthodoxy, as Andrea Simpson makes clear it is for her. It is an outline that emerges, also, from Buddhistic and Vedantic traditions.

It almost seems that, after the attainment of Stage 5 post-conventional morality, two paths of further development are possible. One path leads to a Stage 6 morality of rational justice, eventually supported by a sixth stage religious philosophy of natural law, pantheistic in the case of Marcus Aurelius or Spinoza, theistic in the case of Aquinas. Another path moves in a more mystical direction in religious philosophy toward a loving God and morally moves toward an exemplary ethic of <u>agape</u>. This ethic seems to go "beyond Stage 6 justice" and in that sense suggests a "Stage 7."

In Chapter 9 of Volume I, we discuss at length the philosophic reasons why we believe that Andrea Simpson's ethic of agape does not define an alternative sixth moral stage to the stage of justice as reversibility described earlier in this essay. In brief we argue that the attitude (or principle) of agape presupposes the attitude of principle of equal respect for human personality which is the case of Stage 6 justice, even if it chooses to go beyond it.

The attitude of agape is an ethical attitude of voluntary sacrifice of the self's claims to justice, an attitude of supererogation, which presupposes rights and duties based on justice principles. Such an exemplary ethic still requires acceptance and use of sixth stage justice principles to resolve many dilemmas of distribution which are not settled by the self's willingness to sacrifice. In the Heinz dilemma, for instance, the loving willingness of Heinz to sacrifice himself to save the life of his wife or his friend or acquaintance does not settle the justice choice between the right to life of a dying person and the right to property of the druggist. At the same time, the justice choice of life over property is basically the same whether Heinz has an attitude of sacrifice and agape or an attitude of fairness (treating others' rights as of value like the self's rights).

Another example is the captain's dilemma (cf. Volume 1, Chapter 5). In that dilemma one man must go overboard to lighten the boat so that the others will live. The captain is the only one who can navigate so all will perish if he goes overboard. The dilemma is not resolved by the captain's sillingness for loving sacrifice. None of the other passengers volunteer or are motivated by the attitude of sacrificial love. The dilemma requires a just solution, one best achieved by a lottery in which all (including the captain) participate, recognizing the equal value to life of each person.

Changing the nature of the dilemma by positing that all have the loving sacrificial attitude also does not dispose of justice. A lottery would be required to resolve the choice in a company of saints where all are willing to sacrifice.

In our opinion sixth stage principles would be agreed upon by rational persons for justice dilemmas like our research dilemmas whether persons started

with an ethic of agape (putting the other before the self) or an ethic of fairness (awarding equal value to the basic interests and worth of self and others). It would take a different kind of dilemma than our research dilemmas to clearly distinguish an ethic of agape from an ethic of justice or even from one of rational egoism.

Unfortunately Andrea Simpson was one of few subjects in the Shulik study who was no asked our hypothetical moral dilemmas. Accordingly we do not know whether her response would be interpretable as moral Stage 5 moral Stage 6 or as something unlike our conception of either of these stages.

Rather than bemoaning our lack of hypothetical dilemma material on Andrea Simpson or other "Stage 7" (sixth stage of ethical and religious philosophy) persons, we should rather note that no set of hypothetical moral dilemmas is likely to capture or characterize this stage.

Andrea Simpson's idea of agape, like Marcus Aurelius or Spinoza's idea of natural law represents an ethical and religious world view or perspective on life's meaning which is not captured within the confines of responses to hypothetical dilemmas, and demands an interview like Fowler's for its study.

"Stage 7" and the Existence of Adulthood Stages

The methodological point we have made, the point that a "Stage 7" a sixth stage of ethical and religious philosophy cannot be defined by hypothetical moral dilemmas bears importantly on the issue of the nature of adulthood stages. In addressing this issue, let us briefly review the earlier sections of the essay.

In the early portions of this paper we claimed that our hypothetical dilemma method clearly defined a new stage reached in young adulthood

(sometime between the ages of 20 and 30). In disagreement with John Gibbs, we said this stage, our Stage 5, was a structural stage in the sense defined by the Piaget conception. It is found in many cultures in an invariant sequence coming after a fourth stage. It is a new way of thinking, of judging, and solving moral problems, a way of thinking with clear implications for action. It is a new pattern of thought operations, it is not just a more complex and abstract theory about, or reflection upon, moral problems.

We said also that, we thought, there was a sixth stage of moral reasoning defined by our hypothetical dilemmas. We said, however, further research might show that it was not a new Piagetian structural stage, but was rather what Gibbs said our fifth stage was, a theoretical philosophic reflection upon morality, rather than a new way of solving concrete moral dilemmas. Even if our sixth stage were a true Piagetian stage, it would not, we said, help much in defining adult development since, like Stage 5, it was achievable by young adult philosophy and theology students.

In contrast to hypothetical dilemma stages, the Shulik faith interviews, particularly the interview of Andrea Simpson, does reveal a new adulthood stage. It is clear that Andrea Simpson passes through a midlife crisis of existential and personal despair into a qualitatively new orientation of ethical and religious philosophy. It is not at all clear, however, that Andrea Simpson's movement to "Stage 7" sixth stage of ethical and religious philosophy is movement to a new stage in the Piaget or structural sense. It is not a new way of operational thinking or resolving concrete problems as our Stage 5 was. On the other hand, it is not characterizable primarily as a more abstract philosophic or religious theory, as Gibbs claimed our social Stage 5 was, and as we conceded our moral Stage 6 may be. Rather it is born

in despair and leads to a new way of experiencing and a new way of life. Philosophizing and theory play a part in it, but the process of reflection and reconstruction is intensely personal.

In some ways, the Shulik cases come closer to Erikson functional stage than to Piaget structural stages. Piagetian stages are new structures serving an old function, and displacing or reintegrating the previous structure for that function. Each new moral stage is a new justice structure, serving the old function of moral judgment and choice. Each Erikson stage, hoever, is defined by a new function of the ego and a related choice. For Erikson, Andrea Simpson's despair was primarily a conflict over her generativity and the achievement of a parallel sense of ethicality. She emerged from it with the capacity for ethicality and generative nurturance, first to her brother, then to his fellow inmates and other humans in need of care. At the same time, Andrea Simpson's mother's death promotes a crisis of integrity and its religious resolution. The religious insights she began to have in resolving her despair not only supported ethical action, but later came to function as the core of her integrity in facing disease and death.

Rather than further elaborating an Erikson functional interpretation of the Fowler faith stages we refer the reader to Table 4. Early in this paper,

INSERT TABLE 4 HERE

we provided in Table 2 a summary of the Fowler stages. This summary focussed on the cognitive and social perspective of each stage, each representing a broader and more universal perspective. (A similar "cognitive-structural" summary, but more elaborated was presented in Volume I, Chapter 9.) In contrast, Table 4, taken from Fowler (1980) presents a more Eriksonian characterization of his faith-stages. Stage 5, for instance, is characterized as a midlife

stage of generativity involving the reworking of unconscious as well as conscious components.

Having stated some of the ways in which our case illustrations of the Fowler stages may be said to come close to Erikson ego-functional stages, we need now to return to the stages as conscious ethical and religious reflections. Andrea Simpson's experiences of oneness with "God, Reality, Love or Cosmic Flow" and her parallel sense of brotherhood with other human beings is a religious insight or opening, it is a new and more cosmic cognitive perspective, It is not simply, or primarily, a new sense of the ego and its tasks. It is an act of cognitive reflection, though of personal rather than theoretical reflection.

Erikson's stages, like Levinson's eras, are passed through by all human beings during a certain age period. For Erikson, outcome at a stage is determined by experience at prior stages but onset or occurrences of the stage is not In contrast, the stages we have described represents a sequence in ethical and religious thinking. We noted that our Stage 3 and Stage 4 cases did not seem to be developing in terms of "agesense," in some sense, their terminal faith stage was reached in adolescence or youth. In contrast our examples of a fifth and sixth stage were cases of probable adult growth in a sequence of hierarchical reorganizations.

We cannot say that our cases illustrate strict Piagetian stage-sequential development in adulthood and aging. But the adult development of an Andrea Simpson is certainly a picture of qualitative change in a positive direction.

69 ~~structures of moral reasoning~~. In this sense "Stage 7" is more an Eriksonian functional stage, an adult "stage" of concern with a religious ego function, than a Piagetian structural transformation of a universal religious function. Such a development, however, we believe presupposes attainment of principled or post-conventional reasoning about justice.

If religious functions may not be central universals in every adult's ethical thinking, our cases also illustrate that ~~other writers~~ accounts of adult ethical development which ignore these religious functions do so at their peril. In particular, Gilligan (1980) and Gilligan and Murphy (1980) picture adult moral development as a) a progress through Perry's epistemological phases toward contextual relativism and b) a development in the sense of caring and responsibility rather than in principles of justice. In their account the two are tied together in making adult development a progressive integration of discrepancies between moral principles or ideals and social reality. We would partly agree with this characterization, pointing out that such development is not strictly Piagetian stage development, but rather some interaction between structures of reflection and functional ego "stages." Central to our thinking, however, is the view that

70 the integration of the moral ideal with the ultimately real is a broadly religious problem, as we elaborated in volume I, chapter 8. The development of a mature ethic, an Andrea Simpson, an ethic of supererogatory agape and interpersonal care which Gilligan would call an "ethic of responsibility", cannot be fully understood without awareness of this religious dimension. A commitment to life of agape often inspired by a religious philosophy is a personal ~~device~~ difference from commitment to a life of justice. The development of ethical and religious philosophies define ideals of the good life going beyond justice and beyond moral reasoning, requiring personal reflection on ultimate questions. Such development cannot be fully understood through analysing either hypothetical or real moral dilemmas, it demands a methodology more like Fowler's faith or meaning interview. His approach, we believe, represents an important road to defining moral development in adulthood and aging.

There are those who "have" an ethical and religious philosophy (71)

65 ~~ethical philosophy. But it is one~~ which claims no need for reflection on the issues of ethical and religious philosophy itself. Cases like Mr. Downs make it clear that the stages of faith (or of ethical, and religious philosophy) are stages of reflection on life experience rather than operations of thought governing action like logic and morality. Stages of logic and morality are universal in two senses: first that they address problems which are universal and second that they are universally required for action. On the other hand, stages of faith (ethical and religious philosophy) are only

66 universal in the first sense. Movement in stages of ~~faith,~~ ethical and religious philosophy is an option for individuals who are induced by their own personalities and life circumstances into that form of reflection. The development of advanced stages of faith, ~~ethics, and religion~~ may depend more upon life experiences

67 of crisis of the sort discussed by Erickson than the more universal interactive experiences of social and moral conflict. In this sense stages of faith resemble functional stages. One way in which development in faith, ethics or religion may be seen as an individual variate rather than a universal feature of development is through its linkage to "age sense". The reader will recall that we defined having ~~real~~ "age sense" required experiencing change from within, that is being sensitive and introspective in describing personal change, related to changes

67 & 68 in the life cycle. It should be recalled that Shulik (1979) found a high correlation between age sense and both faith stage and chronological age. Returning to the case of Mr. Downs who said he did not engage in reflection about life and death, we note that he was rated low in "age sense".

69 In contrast, Andrea Simpson was the highest of all our subjects in "age sense", with an ongoing sense of personal development until "life's last breath." Alone among Shulik's subjects, ~~however,~~ she conceptualizes her life as an "ongoing spiritual search". Her spiritual journey through mid-life despair to "Stage 7" seems to be more an optional line of development than is development through universal justice stages.

One of the difficulties inherent in the study of adult development emerges from our discussion of "agesense". This is the fact that a few aging peope. like Andrea Simpson, may be growing, while many other are static and some may even regress. Not many persons, like Andrea Simpson write their first book in their seventies.

In summary, we cannot say that our cases illustrate Piagetian stage-sequential development in adulthood and aging. Yet the adult development of an Andrea Simpson is certainly a picture of qualitative change in a positive direction. One of the difficulties in the study of adult development emerges from our discussion of "age sense". This is that a few aging people like Andrea Simpson may be growing while many others are static and some may even regress. Not many persons, like Andrea Simpson, write their first book in their seventies.

The problem is particularly complicated because if an aging person has developed some wisdom we do not have, it is hard for younger researchers to detect it. In reviewing the case of Andrea Simpson the authors had less a sense of fitting a person to a predetermined stage-category than of learning something from a persons who has developed some wisdom or spiritual sense we do not have and may never attain. If some aging persons do attain a greater wisdom, then among the most important things a student of aging could do is to clarify and communicate that wisdom to others. This means that the student of aging needs to be not only a psychologist and a sociologist but also a philosopher. A loosely Piagetian approach could hardly fail to find that some of the aging are philosophers, at least insofar as they are still developing, as is Andrea Simpson. If this is the case, perhaps gerontology could find some of its own most unique and deepest problems emerging from the field of philosophy rather than from the more familiar concepts of biology and social science.

Table 1
CRITERION JUDGMENT #34

DILEMMA: III
ISSUE: Life
NORM: Life
ELEMENT: Serving human dignity and autonomy, II.13
STAGE & SUB-STAGE: 5

CRITERION JUDGMENT

[Heinz should steal the drug] because the right to life supersedes or transcends the right to property; OR because material values are meaningless when put prior to individual human worth; OR because the law in this case is serving a lesser value than the fundamental right to life; OR because the right to life is universal or basic.

STAGE STRUCTURE

There is a hierarchy of rights and values. Stealing is justified as serving a universal right to or value of life which is prior to laws. This hierarchy is not just one recognized by society or religion, but a judgment of hierarchy rational individuals would make based on logic (i.e., property values presuppose the value of life).

CRITICAL INDICATORS

There must be an appeal to (a) a generalized right to life or the value of life which is either (b) prior to (supersedes, transcends, takes precedence over) or is served by legal or material rights and values, or (c) universal to any society or social order.

DISTINCTIONS AND INCLUSIONS

In general, do not confuse with lower-stage appeals to life as higher or "more important" than law, property, or the druggist's greed (see CJ #9, 18, 25, 29, and 33). This CJ can include the cited CJ's at Stages 3B, 3/4, 4. and 4/5.

MATCH EXAMPLES

1. SHOULD HEINZ STEAL THE DRUG?

Yes. Heinz is working from a hierarchy of values, in which life (at least the life of his wife) is higher than honesty (although he tried that route too -- a lower but real value -- until it proved incapable of serving a higher imperative). From my point of view, as distinct from Heinz's human life and its preservation -- at least as presented here -- must take precedence over other values, like Heinz's desire to be honest and law abiding, or the druggist's love of money and his rights. All values stem from the ultimate value of life.

2. SHOULD HEINZ STEAL THE DRUG? WHY OR WHY NOT?

Yes. He should steal it. A human life is infinitely valuable, while any material object -- in this case the drug -- is not. The woman's right to live exceeds the druggist's right to make a profit.

3. SHOULD HEINZ STEAL THE DRUG? WHY OR WHY NOT?

I think he was justified in breaking in because there was a human life at stake. I think that transcends any right the druggist had to the drug.

The fact that her life was at stake transcends any other standards you might use to judge his actions.

[2-D]

4. SHOULD HEINZ STEAL THE DRUG? WHY OR WHY NOT?

Yes. The fact that his wife was dying would justify stealing the drug. [WHY IS HIS WIFE'S LIFE IMPORTANT TO YOU?] Well, I believe life, human life is the highest priority.

5. HOW ABOUT THE PROPERTY, THE FACT THAT THIS DRUGGIST OWNS THIS PROPERTY, DOESN'T HE HAVE A RIGHT TO THIS PROPERTY?

He has a property right, but I think it is superseded by the right to life.

[2-E]

6. SHOULD HEINZ HAVE DONE THAT?

Yes...It's worth it in the sense of the value of human life because its all well and good to talk about property rights but I don't think they mean much in a society that doesn't value human life higher.

[42-D]

7. TO GO BACK TO YOUR ORIGINAL STATEMENT ABOUT THE DRUGGIST, YOU SAID THAT HE WAS PUTTING MATERIAL GOODS ABOVE HUMAN LIFE. YOU OBVIOUSLY THINK THERE IS SOMETHING WRONG WITH THAT?

I think material wealth has its place, but I think that ultimately it is in the service, in the broad sense, of some of the other kinds of values that we have been talking about, the quality of life, human relationships and that sort of thing. I think material goods are means to a higher end, rather than an end in themselves. I think there is a lot of evidence that people who go after nothing but material goods end up being pretty unhappy. It is dysfunctional as well as kind of not justifiable.

[42-E]

8. SHOULD HEINZ STEAL THE DRUG, WHY OR WHY NOT?

Yeah, he should. Because life is more important than anything else, it is more important than moeny, or anything in this world. [WHAT DO YOU SEE THAT IS IMPORTANT ABOUT LIFE? SPECIAL?] Just the being, the person. Each one is unique, every person is unique and I think every person is important, has his own or her own worth. [TRY TO TELL ME A LITTLE MORE ABOUT WHAT IT IS ABOUT HUMAN LIFE?] I don;t want to tie it to the whole religious thing, but of course that is involved. If you profess the Judeo-Christian faith, it does value the worth of theindividual. God created man in his image, whether that is fiction or a historian's point of view, I don't know, but if you believe that, then the individual does have a definite worth and that individual worth should be placed above any material worth.

[67-E]

9. IN THIS SITUATION LAW AND LIFE COME INTO CONFLICT. HOW CAN YOU RESOLVE THE CONFLICT TAKING THE BEST ARGUMENTS FOR BOTH INTO ACCOUNT?

Well law serves mankind and helps keep order, but where does that law of society come from? It comes from the basic value of life...law is made to preserve life. Therefore, in this case, law is not preserving life, but a lesser right, and should be broken.

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TABLE 2

FOWLER'S STAGES OF FAITH DEVELOPMENT

IN BRIEF DESCRIPTION

Stage 0: Undifferentiated Faith.

This is the rudimentary, undifferentiated faith of the infant and the pre-verbal child, whose sense of self is not yet distinct from his sense of those who take care of him. Hence this is really a non-faith or a pre-faith stage, but Fowler is interested in it nevertheless. It is in this stage that the proper psychodynamic foundation of development and character integrity must be established if the later structures of mature faith are to rest upon a secure base. This pre-faith stage corresponds to the initial stage of "basic trust vs. mistrust" described by Erikson (1950). Fowler acknowledges the importance of this stage but does not elaborate upon it or emphasize it in his writings.

Stage 1: Intuitive-Projective Faith.

This is the relatively unstructured faith of the early verbal child, comprised of moods, actions, regularities, and impressions generated by his interactions with primal (parental or care-taking) adults.

Stage 2: Mythic-Literal Faith.

In this stage, the individual begins to attend to stories, myths, beliefs, and rituals which belong to his family or community. The stage is so named because mythical or ritualistic contents are taken in a very concrete, literal manner. The person observes and adopts attitudes and actions of those around him. This level of faith development is based upon rote repetition or mechanical imitation of the behaviors he observes. Symbols at this level have a concrete, one-dimensional meaning, and authority (or parental) figures are taken as being more important than the examples provided by peers.

Stage 3: Synethetic-Conventional Faith.

In this stage, the person's experience of the world may now extend beyond the family and the primary social group, and it may be differentiated into a number of "regions" (e.g., family, school, work, the friendship circle, the community, etc.). The faith system must now provide a sense of meaningfulness and coherence which embraces different regions or spheres of life experience. Yet the faith system may be regulated by appropriate figures of authority

TABLE 2 - Continued

within each sphere, or by a set of "community authorities" generally respected and held to be important. The person himself is not the genuine source of his own world-view, but rather he reflects a world-view which is established in bases lying outside of himself, as conventional aspects of his environment. In a sense this is a world-view which has been "synthesized" for him. If he were to be transplanted into another culture or another kind of community, then accordingly his earlier world-view would quickly melt away.

Stage 4: Individuating-Reflective Faith.

For many people, this is a stage of faith development which begins to manifest in late adolescence or early adulthood. Here, the person begins to take on the responsibility for his own world-view, in terms of a commitment to others, a self-consciously adopted life-style, or deliberate values. He also acquires a new degree of self-awareness: He takes responsibility for his own actions and choices. Yet he may still be inclined to think of his own world-view as "the one proper and correct view of things" which is associated with his own upbringing and his community. He has difficulty in standing outside of this world-view or in viewing it objectively, for it is still so much a part of himself that it is an unrecognized or unanalyzed facet of his mechanism of social perception. Nevertheless, he can now begin to grasp a number of important polar tensions, or paradoxes, which the person at Stage 3 could not comprehend. Included among these are self-interest vs. the common good, subjectivity vs. objectivity, and relativism vs. absoluteness. Yet in spite of his awareness of these paradoxes, he cannot sustain the sense of tension which they generate. He finds them unpleasant or views them as "problems to be solved" in some manner.

Stage 5: Paradoxical-Consolidative Faith.

At this stage, the individual can grasp the polarities which he first began to understand at Stage 4, but he has much greater tolerance for these polarities. He no longer insists upon "collapsing" them, and he does not have to view them as "problems to be solved." He can sustain his awareness of them.

He feels secure with a faith system which is a part of himself. Accordingly, he can stand outside of that faith system and can consider alternative systems, held by other

TABLE 2 - Continued

individuals, which differ considerably from his own. The Stage 5 person regards the community as a collectivity of individuals who possess differing world-views. He understands symbols and ideas as abstractions. He values symbols and ideals as a means of pulling together the diversity of the community. He also begins to function in a realm of ideals or values which extend beyond the boundaries of his own community, or his own local realm of experience. In this sense it may be possible for him to be a genuine "national citizen" or even a "citizen of the world." Yet the polarities which first emerged in the previous stage may not yet be completely comprehended, and the tensions which they generate may not be entirely to his liking. In thinking of these polarities, he may experience a sensation of helplessness or resignation.

Stage 6: Universalizing Faith.

It should be noted at the outset that this is a stage of faith development which Fowler deems extremely rare, and which he offers as a kind of "ideal type" to represent the ultimate direction of his developmental theory. It is the only one of the six stages which cannot be formally measured by means of the empirical technique. (The same holds true, incidentally, for Kohlberg's sixth and final stage.)

At this stage, the individual's faith system is so clear and coherent that it readily influences others in his community by means of example. All the features of the previous five stages are embodied in this stage. However, in addition, the Stage 6 individual is no longer troubled by the paradoxes which sometimes baffled or pained him in Stages 4 and 5. Furthermore, the Stage 6 person is better equipped than his predecessors to function as a teacher or as an exemplar of faith-development values. He bears an awareness of the very process of faith development itself, which enables him to foster growth and maturation among others with whom he has contact, regardless of their present levels of faith development. In a sense he is "in contact with" the elements of the earlier stages of faith development within himself. He no longer needs to differentiate between himself and the persons at earlier stages, nor does he need to "disown" the earlier stages of development. In a sense, he functions as a teacher but not necessarily in a self-conscious manner. Fowler has identified only six or seven well-known figures whom he places at this developmental level.

SOURCE: J. Fowler, Toward a developmental perspective on faith. Religious Education, 1974, 69, 207-219.

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TABLE 3

EXPECTED PARALLELS BETWEEN DEVELOPMENTAL THEORIES

PIAGET (Cognitive)	KOHLBERG (Moral)	FOWLER (Faith)	ERIKSON (Psychosocial)
(0-2)—Sensory-Motor		0—Undifferentiated	1—Trust v. Mistrust
(2-6)—Intuitive or Pre-Logical [Pre-Operational]	0—The good is what I want and like	1—Intuitive-Projective	2—Autonomy v. Shame and Doubt
(7-11)—Concrete Operations	1—Punishment and obedience orientation		3—Initiative v. Guilt
	2—Instrumental hedonism and concrete reciprocity	2—Mythic-Literal	4—Industry v. Inferiority
(12-) Formal Operations	3—Orientation to interpersonal relations of mutuality	3—Synthetic-Conventional	
	4—Maintenance of social order, fixed rules and authority		5—Identity v. Role-Confusion

JAMES W. FOWLER

PIAGET (Cognitive)	KOHLBERG (Moral)	FOWLER (Faith)	ERIKSON (Psychosocial)
		4—Individuating-Reflexive	6—Intimacy v. Isolation
	5—Social contract, utilitarian, law-making perspective		
Piagetian stages are taken to be necessary but not sufficient for corresponding stages of moral and faith development		5—Paradoxical-Consolidative	7—Generativity v. Stagnation
	6—Universal ethical principle orientation	6—Universalizing	8—Integrity v. Despair

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TABLE 4 - FOWLER'S ERIKSONIAN DESCRIPTION OF STAGES

Undifferentiated Faith

The preconceptual, largely prelinguistic stage in which the infant unconsciously forms a disposition toward its world.

> *Trust, courage, hope, and love are fused in an undifferentiated way and contend with sensed threats of abandonment, inconsistencies, and deprivations in its environment. Though really a prestage, and largely inaccessible to empirical inquiry of the kind we pursue, the quality of mutuality and the strength of trust, autonomy, hope, and courage (or their opposites) developed in this phase underlie (or undermine) all that comes later in faith development.*

Transition to Stage 1 begins with the convergence of thought and language, opening up the use of symbols in speech and ritual-play.

Stage 1. Intuitive-Projective Faith

The fantasy-filled, imitative phase in which the child can be powerfully and permanently influenced by the examples, moods, actions, and language of the visible faith of primal adults.

> *The stage most typical of the child of three to seven, it is marked by a relative fluidity of thought patterns. The child is continually encountering novelties for which no stable operations of knowing have been formed. The imaginative processes underlying fantasy are unrestrained and uninhibited by logical thought. In league with forms of knowing dominated by perception, imagination in this stage is extremely productive of long-lasting images and feelings*

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(positive and negative) which, later, more stable and self-reflective valuing and thinking will have to order and sort out. This is the stage of first self-awareness. The "self-aware" child is egocentric as regards the perspectives of others. Here we find first awarenesses of death and sex, and of the strong taboos by which cultures and families insulate those powerful areas.

The emergence of Concrete Operational thinking underlies the transition to Stage 2. Affectively, the resolution of Oedipal issues or their submersion in latency are important accompanying factors.[28] At the heart of the transition is the child's growing concern to *know* how things are and to clarify for himself or herself the bases of distinctions between what is real and what only seems to be.

Stage 2. Mythic-Literal Faith

The stage in which the person begins to take on for himself or herself the stories, beliefs, and observances which symbolize belonging to his or her community. Beliefs are appropriated with literal interpretations, as are moral rules and attitudes. Symbols are taken as one-dimensional and literal in meaning.

In this stage the rise of Concrete Operations leads to the curbing and ordering of the previous stage's imaginative composing of the world. The episodic quality of Intuitive-Projective Faith gives way to a more linear, narrative construction of coherence and meaning. Story becomes the major way of giving unity and value to experience.[29] This is the faith stage of the school child (though we sometimes find its structures dominant in adolescents and in adults). Marked by increased accuracy in taking the perspective of other persons, Stage 2 composes a world based on reciprocal fairness and an immanent justice based on reciprocity. The actors in its cosmic stories are full-fledged anthropomorphic "personalities." It

[28] See chapter by Jaspars in this volume.

[29] Chapter by Hauerwas in this volume points to the continuing power of narrative to form and express our meanings in this stage and continuing into the later stages.

can be affected deeply and powerfully by symbolic and dramatic materials, and can describe in endlessly detailed narrative what has occurred. Stage 2 does not, however, step back from the flow of its stories to formulate reflective, conceptual meanings. For this stage the meaning is both carried and "trapped" in the narrative.

The implicit clash or contradiction of stories leads to reflection on meanings. The transition to Formal Operational thought makes such reflection possible and necessary. Previous literalism breaks down; new "cognitive conceit" (Elkind) leads to disillusionment with previous teachers and teachings. Conflicts between authoritative stories (i.e., Genesis on creation vs. evolutionary theory) must be faced. The emergence of mutual interpersonal perspective-taking ("I see you seeing me; I see me as you see me; I see you seeing me seeing you.") creates the need for a more personal relationship with the unifying power of the Ultimate Environment.

Stage 3. Synthetic-Conventional Faith

The person's experience of the world now extends beyond the family. A number of spheres demand attention: family, school or work, peers, street society and media, and perhaps religion. Faith must provide a coherent orientation in the midst of that more complex and diverse range of involvements. Faith must synthesize values and information; it must provide a unifying basis for identity and outlook.

Stage 3 typically has its rise and ascendency in adolescence, but for many adults it becomes a permanent equilibration. It structures the ultimate environment in interpersonal terms. Its images of unifying value and power derive from the extension of qualities experienced in personal relationships. It is a "conformist" stage in the sense that it is acutely tuned to the expectations and judgments of significant others, and as yet does not have a sure enough grasp on its own identity and autonomous judgment to construct and maintain an independent perspective. While beliefs and values are deeply felt, they typically are tacitly held—the person "dwells" in

them and the meaning world they mediate. But there has not been occasion reflectively to step outside them to examine them explicitly or systematically. At Stage 3 a person has an "ideology," a more or less consistent clustering of values and beliefs, but he or she has not objectified it for examination, and in a sense is unaware of having it. Differences of outlook with others are experienced as differences in "kind" of person. Authority is located in the incumbents of traditional authority-roles (if perceived as personally worthy) or in the concensus of a valued, face-to-face group.

Factors contributing to the breakdown of Stage 3 and to readiness for transition may include any one or more of the following: serious clashes or contradictions between valued authority sources; marked changes, by officially sanctioned leaders, of policies or practices previously deemed sacred and unbreachable (i.e., in the Catholic Church changing the Mass from Latin to the vernacular, or no longer requiring abstinence from meat on Friday); the encounter with experiences or perspectives that lead to critical reflection on how one's beliefs and values have formed and changed, and on how "relative" they are to one's particular group or background.

Stage 4. Individuative-Reflective Faith

The movement from Stage 3 to Stage 4 is particularly critical, for it is in this transition that the late adolescent or adult must begin to take seriously the burden of responsibility for his or her own commitments, life-style, beliefs, and attitudes. Where genuine movement toward Stage 4 is under way, the person must face certain unavoidable tensions: Individuality versus being defined by a group or group membership; Subjectivity and the power of one's strongly felt but unexamined feelings versus Objectivity and the requirement of critical reflection; Self-fulfillment or self-actualization as a primary concern versus Service to and being for others; the question of being committed to Relative versus Struggle with the possibility of an absolute.

This stage most appropriately takes form in young adulthood (but let us remember that many adults do not construct it and that for a significant group it emerges only in the mid-thirties or forties). This stage is marked by a double development. The self, previously sustained in its identity and faith compositions by an interpersonal circle of significant others, now claims an identity no longer defined by the composite of one's roles or meanings to others. To sustain that new identity, it composes a meaning frame conscious of its own boundaries and inner connections, and aware of itself as a "world view." Self (identity) and outlook (world view) are differentiated from those of others, and become acknowledged factors in the reactions, interpretations, and judgments one makes on the actions of the self and others. It expresses its intuitions of coherence in an ultimate environment in terms of an explicit system of meanings. Stage 4 typically translates symbols into conceptual meanings. This is a "demythologizing" stage. It is likely to attend minimally to unconscious factors influencing its judgments and behavior.

Restless with the self-images and outlook maintained by Stage 4, the person ready for transition finds himself or herself attending to what may feel like anarchic and disturbing inner voices. Elements from a childish past, images and energies from a deeper self, a gnawing sense of the sterility and flatness of the meanings one serves—any or all of these may signal readiness for something new. Stories, symbols, myths, paradoxes from one's own or other traditions may insist on breaking in upon the neatness of the previous faith. Disillusionment with one's compromises, and recognition that life is more complex than Stage 4's logic of clear distinctions and abstract concepts can comprehend, press one toward a more dialectical and multileveled approach to life-truth.

Stage 5. Paradoxical-Consolidative Faith

This stage involves the integration into self and outlook of much that was suppressed or evaded in the interest of Stage 4's self-certainty and conscious cognitive and affective adaptation to reality. This stage develops a "second naivete" (Ricoeur) in which symbolic power is reunited with conceptual meanings. Here there

must also be a new reclaiming and reworking of one's past. There must be an opening to the voices of one's "deeper self." Importantly, this involves a critical recognition of one's *social unconscious*—the myths, ideal images, and prejudices built deeply into the self-system by virtue of one's nurture within a particular social class, religious tradition, ethnic group, or the like.

> *Unusual before midlife, Stage 5 knows the sacrament of defeat and the reality of irrevocable commitments and acts. What the previous stage struggled to clarify, in terms of the boundaries of self and outlook, this stage now makes porous and permeable. Alive to paradox and the truth in apparent contradictions, this stage strives to unify opposites in mind and experience. It generates and maintains vulnerability to the strange truths of those who are "other." Ready for closeness to that which is different and threatening to self and outlook (including new depths of experience in spirituality and religious revelation), this stage has a commitment to justice that is freed from the confines of tribe, class, religious community, or nation. And with the seriousness that can arise when life is more than half over, this stage is ready to spend and be spent for the cause of conserving and cultivating the possibility of others' generating identity and meaning.*

Stage 5 can appreciate symbols, myths, and rituals (its own and others') because it has been grasped, in some measure, by the depth of reality to which they refer. It also sees the divisions of the human family vividly because it has been apprehended by the possibility (and imperative) of an inclusive community of being. But this stage remains divided. It lives and acts between an untransformed world and a transforming vision and loyalties. In some few cases this division yields to the call of the radical actualization that we call Stage 6.

Stage 6. Universalizing Faith

This stage is exceedingly rare. The persons best described by this stage have generated faith compositions in which their felt sense of an Ultimate Environment is inclusive of all being. They become

incarnators and actualizers of the spirit of a fulfilled human community.

> *They are "contagious" in the sense that they create zones of liberation from the social, political, economic, and ideological shackles we place and endure on human futurity. Living with felt participation in a Power that unifies and transforms the world, Universalizers are often experienced as subversive of the structures (including religious structures) by which we sustain our individual and corporate survival, security and significance. Many persons in this stage die at the hands of those whom they hope to change. Universalizers are often more honored and revered after death than during their lives. The rare persons who may be described by this stage have a special grace that makes them seem more lucid, more simple, and yet somehow more fully human than the rest of us. Their community is universal in extent. Particularities are cherished because they are vessels of the universal, and are thereby valuable apart from any utilitarian considerations. Life is both loved and held too loosely. Such persons are ready for fellowship with persons at any of the other stages and from any other faith tradition.*